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LIQUID BUSINESS 
VANESSA CASADO PEREZ* 
Water is scarcer due to climate change and in higher demand due  
to population growth than ever before. As if these stressors were not 
concerning enough, corporate investors are participating in water mar-
kets in ways that sidestep U.S. water law doctrine’s aims of preventing 
speculation and assuring that the holders of water rights internalize 
any externalities associated with changes in their rights. The operation 
of these new players in the shadow of traditional water law is produc-
ing elements of inefficiency and unfairness in the allocation of water 
rights. Resisting the polar calls for unfettered water markets, or, con-
trarily, the complete de-commodification of water in the face of these 
challenges, this Article identifies a portfolio of measures that can help 
get regulated water markets back on a prudent, sustainable track in 
our contemporary world. The portfolio includes institutional changes 
and measures aimed at redefining water rights. Regarding the admin-
istration and management of water rights, the Article proposes: mech-
anisms to address the effects on the communities where water origi-
nates, structures for joint management of surface and ground  
water; and tools to ensure fulfillment of all persons’ basic water needs. 
The changes in water rights: exclude return flows; establish character 
criteria for water rights holders; and define quantitative limits on the 
amount of water one person or entity can hold at a given time.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION1 
The aphorism “water is the new oil”2 is now truer than it has ever 
been. While many use the phrase to suggest that water is as scarce 
and valuable as oil once was, it is also true in another sense: 
 
 1.  This introduction is inspired by an essay published by the author as part of Inara 
Scott et al., Environmental Law. Disrupted., 49 ENVTL. L. REP. 10038 (2019). Also available 
as a blog post: Vanessa Casado Pérez, Liquid Business, ENVTL. L. PROF BLOG (Nov. 13, 2018), 
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental_law/2018/11/liquid-business.html. 
 2. See generally Julian Brookes, Why Water Is the New Oil, ROLLING STONE (July 7, 
2011, 11:20 AM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/why-water-is-the-new-
oil-198747/ [https://perma.cc/FY2P-P9VY]; Andrew Ward, Water Set to Become More Valua-
ble than Oil, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/fa9f125c-0b0d-11e7-
ac5a-903b21361b43 [https://perma.cc/RX27-3VJ9]; Steven Solomon, Water Is the New Oil, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2010, 5:12 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-solo-
mon/water-is-the-new-oil_b_380803.html [https://perma.cc/EXN6-4T2C]; David Wethe, Wa-
ter Is Almost as Precious as Oil in the Permian Basin, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 24, 2019, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-24/ranch-fetches-33-million-and-proves-
water-is-red-hot-commodity [https://perma.cc/9PAF-UT4W]. 
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speculation in water markets now rivals speculation in oil markets. 
Oddly, however, water scarcity has not translated into a higher price 
for water, as it has done in oil. But this anomaly may be on the verge 
of changing as international investors start to enter the business of 
climate change.3 From oil tycoons like T. Boone Pickens4 or the Bass 
brothers5 to international hedge funds,6 investment in all things water 
is on the rise. And while many deny climate change, the market does 
not. Since climate change is widely expected to induce scarcity in water 
supplies, business investments in the water market broadly under-
stood are increasing rapidly.7 This investment disproves the long-held 
theory that water was different than, say, energy, because the regula-
tory framework stifled innovation and investment.8 While regulations 
may have discouraged those in the past, when water has become truly 
valuable, money like water has found a hole.  
The alarm has gone off. Those who believe markets should not com-
modify water are appalled by the role that investment moguls play.9 
These new investments in water escape the rules that constraint spec-
ulation10 and protect third parties and the environment from external-
ities in traditional water markets, that is, in the exchange of water 
rights. Water may no longer be speculation resistant. 11  
 
 3. See generally MCKENZIE FUNK, WINDFALL: THE BOOMING BUSINESS OF GLOBAL 
WARMING (2014). Nonetheless, the very term “water market” is ambiguous. Those who crit-
icize water markets often conflate trading of water rights with privatization of water utili-
ties. That is a mistake. It is both too broad, in that it encompasses more than trading the 
water itself, and too narrow, in that water investors look beyond water rights and water 
utilities to things like water conservation and wastewater. VANESSA CASADO PÉREZ, THE 
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN WATER MARKETS 15-16 (2017). 
 4. Sandra Zellmer, The Anti-Speculation Doctrine and Its Implications for Collabora-
tive Water Management, 8 NEV. L. J. 994, 999 (2008). 
 5. Peter Passell, A Gush of Profits from Water Sale?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 1998), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/23/business/a-gush-of-profits-from-water-sale.html 
[https://perma.cc/W5K4-3DSV]. 
 6. Abrahm Lustgarten & ProPublica, A Free-Market Plan to Save the American West 
from Drought, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 2016,  https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ 
archive/2016/03/a-plan-to-save-the-american-west-from-drought/426846/ [https://perma.cc/ 
BM3M-9RBF]. 
 7. Zellmer, supra note 4, at 995. 
 8. NEWSHA K. AJAMI ET AL., STANFORD WOODS INSTITUTE FOR THE ENV’T, THE PATH 
TO WATER INNOVATION 11–14 (2014), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/ 
downloads_and_links/path_to_water_innovation_thompson_paper_final.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/T5C3-LAU5]. 
 9. MAUDE BARLOW & TONY CLARKE, BLUE GOLD: THE FIGHT TO STOP THE CORPORATE 
THEFT OF THE WORLD’S WATER 79 (2005). 
 10. Zellmer, supra note 4, at 997. For the claim that water is more speculation-resistant 
than oil, see Timothy Egan, Near Vast Bodies of Water, Land Lies Parched, N.Y. TIMES,  
(Aug. 12, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/12/us/near-vast-bodies-of-water-land-
lies-parched.html [https://perma.cc/663Y-PXWY]. 
 11. Id.  
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Water rights can be traded in the Western United States and in 
other jurisdictions such as Australia or Chile.12 Trade includes leases 
and sales of water rights that give the buyer the right to use water  
if it is available.13 Transactions are often subject to the approval of  
an administrative agency and are not approved if they injure third 
parties or the environment.14 Water rights are defined across several 
variables, including the point of diversion and the type of use.15  
A transaction will normally imply a change in either or both of those 
variables. Before a transaction takes place, a water agency ensures 
that those changes will not affect other users or the ecosystem.16 A 
common transaction might be one between an agricultural right holder 
and an urban consumer, because the latter often has a higher willing-
ness to pay and a less elastic demand curve.17 In the Western United 
States, these types of transactions have brought flexibility to water 
allocation systems, where the majority of water rights were allocated 
when agriculture was the main economic activity, and large cities  
and suburban areas with luscious lawns had not developed.18 Those 
transactions should make the farmer realize the opportunity cost of 
using water. But as a result of the review procedure, these exchanges 
imply high transaction costs.19 Those transaction costs are even higher 
when water, inherently a local good, needs to be transported. Thus, 
speculators may be dissuaded.20  
Another barrier against speculation, and more relevant for the  
purposes of speculation, is the forfeiture provision included in all prior 
appropriation states and many other jurisdictions.21 Forfeiture of  
unused rights is based on the idea that we allow private parties rights 
over a common resource—water—only for productive purposes, and 
sitting on your rights to increase your profit is not a productive 
 
 12. Id; see generally Tim Goesch et al., Snapshot of Australian Water Markets, ABARES 
INSIGHTS, no. 2, 2019, at 1, https://www.agriculture.gov.au/abares/publications/insights/ 
snapshot-of-australian-water-markets [https://perma.cc/Q4JM-MZTX]. 
 13. Ellen Hanak et al., California’s Water Market, PPIC WATER POL’Y CTR. (May 2019), 
https://www.ppic.org/publication/californias-water-market/ [https://perma.cc/AM35-L52R]. 
 14. See Zellmer, supra note 4, at 1025. 
 15. See id. at 1012. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 1019, 1023–24. 
 18. Id. at 1007–09, 1019–22. 
 19. Id. at 1019–22; see also K. William Easter et al., Water Markets: Transaction Costs 
and Institutional Options, in MARKETS FOR WATER: POTENTIAL AND PERFORMANCE 1–18 (K. 
William Easter et al., eds., 1998). 
 20. See Zellmer, supra note 4, at 1004. 
 21. Janet C. Neuman & Keith Hirokawa, How Good is an Old Water Right? The Appli-
cation of Statutory Forfeiture Provisions to Pre-Code Water Rights, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. 
REV. 1, 5 (2000). 
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purpose.22 These forfeiture provisions mandate that holders of water 
rights use the water.23 If they do not use it for a certain period, usually 
around five years, they may lose the water right.24 So unlike with real 
estate or stocks and bonds, where owners can wait for the market to 
peak and then sell their assets, in water markets, owners cannot en-
gage in this kind of wait-and-see. That said, if water becomes valuable 
enough, investors may find a way around these rules. One company, 
Water Asset Management, is taking that route by considering land as 
an accessory.25 It focuses on water itself, but to get to it, it buys land, 
and it tries to make use of the land to break even.26  
While investors do buy water rights, the constraints may explain 
why, in our current water scarcity scenario we have mostly seen  
investments toward related industries, such as water conservation 
technology, water utilities, or reuse. While water rights changes and 
exchanges are subject to a review in order to prevent negative exter-
nalities on third parties and discourage speculation, the investments 
in other water assets or water related industries is not subject to such 
control. Thus, the current landscape in water markets can entail a  
series of negative effects for which the regulatory framework does not 
have answers to.27 This Article identifies those problems and offers  
potential regulatory avenues to address them.  
 The current investment in all things water, from water rights to 
water utilities, gives raise to among others the following concerns. 
First, some companies who have contributed to climate change are now 
benefiting from their own misconduct because these companies are in-
vesting in water, an asset made more valuable as result of climate 
change.28 Second, corporatization moves the locus of decision further 
away from the area where water originates from and the community 
from the area may suffer negative consequences. While economists 
despise community externalities, this type of effects has been ad-
dressed in traditional water markets. 29 In addition, there may certain 
 
 22. ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., MODERN WATER LAW. PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC 
RIGHTS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 148–49 (2013). 
 23. Zellmer, supra note 4, at 1005. 
 24. LEON F. SZEPTYCKI ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL WATER RIGHTS TRANSFERS: A REVIEW 
OF STATE LAWS 14 (2015). Some states, like New Mexico, have a lower time limit. New Mexico 
has a four year forfeiture provision. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 150.  
 25. Lustgarten & ProPublica, supra note 6. 
 26. Id. 
 27. TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE INVISIBLE 
PUMP 1–16 (1997). 
 28. See infra section IV.A. 
 29. See generally Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Charles W. Howe, Area-of-Origin Protec-
tion in Transbasin Water Diversions: An Evaluation of Alternative Approaches, 57 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 527 (1985); see also A. Dan Tarlock, Reconnecting Property Rights to Watersheds, 25 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 69 (2000). 
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intangible values, mainly the communitarian values water embeds,  
in a single monetary price.30 Third, water prices are expected to  
increase.31 There is some merit in valuing water as a scarce resource 
so that we do not misuse it. The more expensive it is, the shorter our 
showers would be and the more thoughtful the choice of crops and  
irrigation techniques would be. Today we do not put a price on scarcity; 
water bills reflect only treatment and transportation costs.32 Paying 
water’s true value will make everyone more conscious of the choices 
we make. But, at the same time, the low-income population may be 
priced out. Fourth, a few actors, mainly the large international water 
companies, may dominate these new and expanded water markets. 
Fifth, new investments in water are exploiting regulatory gaps in the 
current system. For example, while scientifically nobody denies that 
surface and groundwater are connected, some of our water laws do.33 
Accordingly, investors may turn to groundwater to escape regulatory 
control34 and, thus, cause effects on existing water users and the  
ecosystem. Similarly, investment in water reuse may have systemic 
effects because it reduces return flows and other users have relied on  
 
  
 
 30. See Vanessa Casado Pe ́rez, Missing Water Markets: A Cautionary Tale of Govern-
mental Failure, 23 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 157, 166 (2015). Other illustrations of the particular 
attachment of communities to water can be found in Barton H. Thompson Jr., Institutional 
Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 734 (1993) (a water board 
elected by the population that votes in any other local election, not just by farmers, are usu-
ally more reluctant to approve water transactions). See also, J. Owen Saunders, Trade Agree-
ments and Environmental Sovereignty: Case Studies from Canada, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
1171, 1180–81 (1995) (reporting that Canadians have a different reaction to the sale of water 
than they have to the sale of other natural resources).  
 31. David Zetland, Zetland on Segerfeldt, ‘Water for Sale: How Business and the Market 
Can Resolve the World's Water Crisis’, H-WATER (June 21, 2009) (book review), https:// 
networks.h-net.org/node/15526/reviews/15638/zetland-segerfeldt-water-sale-how-business-
and-market-can-resolve [https://perma.cc/B4VD-K2D6]. 
 32. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, Understanding Your Water Bill, https://www. 
epa.gov/watersense/understanding-your-water-bill [https://perma.cc/5XLS-69TJ].  
 33. For a description about the hydrology of groundwater and the interconnection be-
tween surface water and groundwater see ADLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 173–78. For the 
conflicts between surface and groundwater see id. at 206–25. For an example of the overex-
ploitation of both connected resources see Candice Wang, Appetite for California Almonds 
Still Growing, but Farmers Feel Squeeze from New Water Rules, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 2, 
2019, 5:30 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/environment/article231906623.html (al-
mond growers in California facing curtailments of water rights due to instream flow protec-
tions may turn to groundwater affecting the same stream). 
 34. Tate Dwinnell, T. Boone Pickens Invests in Water—Should You?, SEEKING ALPHA 
(Jan. 17, 2007, 3:55 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/24410-t-boone-pickens-invests-in-
water-should-you [https://perma.cc/7K76-ZFYY]. 
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these flows to fulfill their rights.35 Finally, these new investments are 
able to sidestep the anti-speculation rules in water rights by paying lip 
service to them. 
Scholars writing on water rights exchanges can be classified in 
three groups depending on their stance toward markets as a water 
management tool. On the one side, free-market environmentalists  
defend markets for the allocation of any natural resource as a better 
method than administrative allocation.36 On the other, there are those 
who believe that water should never be subject to market rules.37 In 
between, there is a third group that looks at markets as one of the tools 
in the water management toolkit and focuses on how to structure 
them.38 The literature on water markets broadly understood, which 
encompasses far more than water rights exchanges, is not dominated 
by legal academics, but it presents a similar division. There are schol-
ars at both extremes—pro-market39 and against commodification40—
but the middle group, which can be found in the legal scholarship on 
 
 35. Montana v. Wyoming, 563 U.S. 368, 377–78 (2011); Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Mon-
tana v. Wyoming: Sprinklers, Irrigation Water Use Efficiency, and the Doctrine of Recapture, 
5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L. J. 265 (2012). For an analysis of the systemic effects, see 
Vanessa Casado Pérez, Inefficient Efficiency: Crying Over Spilled Water, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. 
11046, 11058 (2016). 
 36. See James L. Huffman, Institutional Constraints on Transboundary Marketing, in 
WATER MARKETING: THE NEXT GENERATION 32 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 
1997); TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (rev. ed. 
2001); TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, supra note 27; see also James L. Huffman, 
Water Marketing in Western Prior Appropriation States: A Model for the East, 21 GA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 429 (2004) [hereinafter Huffman, Water Marketing]; James L. Huffman, Markets, 
Regulation, and Environmental Protection, 55 MONT. L. REV. 425 (1994); Andrew P. Morriss, 
Real People, Real Resources, and Real Choices: The Case for Market Valuation of Water, 38 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 973, 983 (2006); RODNEY T. SMITH, TRADING WATER: AN ECONOMIC AND 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR WATER MARKETING (1988); Mateen Thobani, Tradable Property 
Rights to Water: How to Improve Water Use and Resolve Water Conflicts, 34 PUB. POL’Y FOR 
PRIV. SECTOR, Feb. 1995, at 1, 1, https://sswm.info/sites/default/files/reference_attachments/ 
THOBANI%201995%20Tradable%20Property%20Rights%20to%20Water.pdf?iframeView 
=true [https://perma.cc/23WR-GU45]. 
 37. See, e.g., Norman W. Spaulding III, Commodification and Its Discontents: Environ-
mentalism and the Promise of Market Incentives, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 293, 295–96, 324–25 
(1997); Michael C. Blumm, The Fallacies of Free Market Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 371, 375 (1992); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names 
Right: The Myth of Markets for Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 317, 320 
(2000). 
 38. See Joseph L. Sax, Understanding Transfers: Community Rights and the Privatiza-
tion of Water, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL L. & POL’Y 33, 35–38 (2008); Barton H. Thomp-
son, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 673–
79 (1993); Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1873, 1884–88 (2005) (advocating for a community perspective in water markets in order to 
channel the potential externalities); see also Robert Glennon, The Quest for More Water—
Why Markets Are Inevitable, 24 PERC REP., no. 3, Sept. 2006, at 7, 9, https://www.perc.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2018/01/sept06.pdf [https://perma.cc/XN86-8QXP]. 
 39. See generally FREDRIK SEGERFELDT, WATER FOR SALE: HOW BUSINESS AND THE 
MARKET CAN RESOLVE THE WORLD’S WATER CRISIS (2005). 
 40. See generally BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 9. 
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exchanges of water rights, is somewhat missing in the discussion 
about water markets broadly understood. This Article aims at filling 
that middle gap from a legal perspective by offering water regulatory 
tools. In other words, water markets today are way more than the  
exchange of water rights between farmers, and water regulation needs 
to adapt to the challenges this new form of water markets present 
without compromising the efficiency and fairness principles behind 
Western water law.  
Accordingly, this Article does not try to answer the complex and 
multi-faceted question of whether water should be a commodity like 
oil. To an extent, some of the forces pushing water towards commodi-
fication are unstoppable. This paper answers the question of whether 
there is something that water law could do to mitigate the negative 
externalities that may arise from this new money flowing into water 
markets and ensure a certain level of fairness, where fairness is a con-
cern, in the allocation of water. No matter where someone stands on 
the debate on water as a public commodity, everyone would agree that 
negative externalities should be internalized. But many, in addition, 
believe that given how essential for life water is, it has a special place 
in our society and should not be allocated like other commodities. This 
view of water as special is shown in the constitutional broad proclama-
tions that water is of the public. Fairness in water allocation stems 
from this view, as well as the fact that water is essential to life. The 
fairness concern in natural resources is also often closely related to the 
protection of smaller users, such as family farms. It remains to be seen 
whether a far more distributed allocation has larger social benefits 
than an allocation between a few large-scale companies. In any event, 
agencies would be less powerful if they only regulated big companies.  
This Article shows how states could use their water law to tackle 
some of the problems presented by water markets while recognizing 
that water exchanges are a positive tool in a broad water management 
toolkit to ensure flexibility in water allocation. Hence, given that 
plenty of forces are pushing water to be the new oil and the commodi-
fication of water may be unstoppable,  states should tackle the poten-
tial negative effects of markets in their water regulations, both  
addressing efficiency and fairness concerns. First, a framework to  
consider and mitigate the effects on communities and to give these 
communities voice is necessary. Second, strategies like vouchers or 
tiered pricing in water bills could attenuate the affordability crisis in 
low-income communities if water prices go up. Third, states should 
adopt conjunctive management of surface and groundwater via a 
2019] LIQUID BUSINESS 
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permit system, 41 reform their current approach to return flows, and 
enhance their anti-speculation regulations by making it more difficult 
for water investors to sit on their water rights and prevent accumula-
tion of water rights in few hands. Water law can take a page from other 
natural resources markets and avoid concentration by limiting the 
amount of water rights that can be accumulated in the same hands. In 
fisheries’ individual transferable quota (ITQ) programs, there are lim-
its on the shares of the total allowable catch that a single ITQ owner 
can acquire.42 
An adage seems appropriate to close this introduction. Mark Twain 
purportedly said that, “Whisky is for drinking and water is for 
fighting.”43 Water scarcity will certainly cause fights, as there will not 
be enough water for all users. Companies see water as ripe for business 
and maximizing its value is essential. But the question that lingers  
is whether water law can put up a fight and reduce the risk that cor-
porate interests may disrupt the water regulatory regime.44 Water 
markets broadly understood must be regulated markets. Water  
already is and may continue to be a commodity, but the portfolio of 
measures presented in this piece should make it a public commodity, 
recognizing that water is special, essential, and irreplaceable.45 
Section II explains the reasons why water has become an attractive 
commodity. Section III explores the different ways investment is pour-
ing into water, from investing in related industries to investing in  
water as an asset. Section IV describes the perceived negative effects 
from the private investment in water, and Section V sketches potential 
measures that could mitigate those concerns.  
  
 
 41. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Beyond Connections: Pursuing Multidimensional 
Conjunctive Management, 47 IDAHO L. REV. 273, 275 (2011). For an explanation of the move 
towards permits for surface water, see ADLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 231–72. 
 42. Katrina M. Wyman, Second Generation Property Rights Issues, NAT’L RESOURCES 
J. 215, 220, n.37 (2019). 
 43. Cary Blake, Whiskey is for Drinking; Agriculture Water is for Fighting, FARM PRO-
GRESS (Mar. 25, 2013), https://farmprogress.com/blog/whiskey-drinking-agriculture-water-
fighting [https://perma.cc/5GPV-3FYM]. 
 44. For an identification of the risks of the corporatization of energy markets, see Gina 
S. Warren, 1-Click Energy: Managing Corporate Demand for Clean Power, 78 MD. L. REV. 
73, 101 (2018).  
 45. See also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water as a Public Commodity, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 
17, 17–19 (2011). 
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II.   WHY IS WATER SO ECONOMICALLY VALUABLE?  
Water is essential. It is considered an “axis resource” because  
it underlies all others,46 particularly all the drivers of growth.47  
Water is getting scarcer. Water scarcity is a function of supply and 
demand. While water demands are increasing because of population 
growth and changes in lifestyle,48 water supply is dwindling.49 An  
average American uses about 100 gallons a day at home;50 however, 
his water footprint is much larger, up to 2,200 gallons a day51 once  
we take into account water needed for products he consumes. For  
example, a pound of beef requires 1,799 gallons of water,52 and the  
average American consumes 222.2 pounds of meat a year.53 Further-
more, an average American drinks 167 plastic water bottles a  
year,54 more than 39 gallons of bottled water, making the water  
bottle business a profitable one. In fact, nowadays, the average  
American drinks more bottled water than he drinks soda.55 As  
 
 46. ALEX PRUD’HOMME, THE RIPPLE EFFECT: THE FATE OF FRESHWATER IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 4 (2012). 
 47. Global Water Initiative, WORLD ECON. F., https://www.weforum.org/projects/global-
water-initiative [https://perma.cc/GR79-XEW5] (last visited Sept. 9, 2019). 
 48. M. Kummu et al., The World’s Road to Water Scarcity: Shortage and Stress in  
the 20th Century and Pathways Towards Sustainability, SCI. REP. (Dec. 9, 2016), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5146931/pdf/srep38495.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/U4LU-RCNW]. 
 49. Ashish Sharma et al., If Precipitation Extremes Are Increasing, Why Aren't Floods? 
54 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH RES. 8545 (2018); Drought and Climate Change, CENTER 
FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, https://www.c2es.org/content/drought-and-climate-
change/https://www.c2es.org/content/drought-and-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/S459-
2E8B]. 
 50. Water Q&A: How Much Water Do I Use at Home Each Day?, USGS: WATER SCI. 
SCH., https://water.usgs.gov/edu/qa-home-percapita.html [https://perma.cc/CQ5U-CP9L]. 
 51. Water Footprint Comparisons by Country, WATER FOOTPRINT CALCULATOR  
(May 22, 2017), https://www.watercalculator.org/footprints/water-footprints-by-country/ 
[https://perma.cc/S6AR-C6UA]. 
 52. Betty Hallock, To Make a Burger, First You Need 660 Gallons of Water . . . , L.A. 
TIMES (Jan. 27, 2014, 2:35 PM), https://www.latimes.com/food/dailydish/la-dd-gallons-of- 
water-to-make-a-burger-20140124-story.html [https://perma.cc/6V88-BM28]. 
 53. Megan Durisin & Shruti Date Singh, Americans’ Meat Consumption Set to Hit a 
Record in 2018, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 2, 2018, 8:52 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/ 
business/americans-meat-consumption-set-to-hit-a-record-in-2018/ [https://perma.cc/Y44H-
RTGL]. 
 54. Charles Fishman, Message in a Bottle, FAST CO. (July 1, 2007), https://www.fast-
company.com/59971/message-bottle [https://perma.cc/QF2T-PTYK]. 
 55. Americans Drank More Bottled Water than Soda in 2016, CNBC (Mar. 10,  
2017, 5:39 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/10/americans-drank-more-bottled-water-
than-soda-in-2016.html [https://perma.cc/54AW-Q4R5]. 
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other countries’ lifestyles become more similar to the United States,56 
the pressure on already scarce global water resources increases.  
On the supply side, people often live in areas where water is not 
readily available. For a long time, we have relied on large infrastruc-
ture projects to ship water from humid areas to dry areas.57 Supply is 
threatened both by the quality of that infrastructure and by climate 
change.58 Water and wastewater infrastructure have received grades 
of D59 and D+,60 respectively, in the last scorecard of the American  
Society of Civil Engineers. This institution estimates that an invest-
ment of more than $1 trillion in water distribution infrastructure  
is necessary to meet the demand for the next 25 years.61 Water  
infrastructure provision is one of the areas where the private sector is 
investing.62 Furthermore, given the level of capital investment  
necessary, this is one of the justifications for the water sector to  
privatize traditional public functions.  
Regarding the effects of climate change, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change predicts that more people are going to live 
in water stressed regions of the world in 2050, and in those regions, 
 
 56. Marcello Rossi, Will China’s Growing Appetite for Meat Undermine Its Efforts  
to Fight Climate Change?, SMITHSONIAN (July 30, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag. 
com/science-nature/will-chinas-growing-appetite-for-meat-undermind-its-efforts-to-fight- 
climate-change-180969789/ [https://perma.cc/R5JG-PNU8]. 
 57. Susanna Eden & Rachel Murray, Water, Business, and the Business of Water,  
ARROYO, 2019 at 3 (2019); https://wrrc.arizona.edu/sites/wrrc.arizona.edu/files/attachment/ 
Arroyo-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/HL3H-JKMW]; Jeanine Jones, History of Large-Scale 
Western Water Projects, SW. HYDROLOGY, Sept./Oct. 2008, at 18, http://www.swhydro. 
arizona.edu/archive/V7_N5/feature1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q87Q-79HC]. 
 58. David Sedlak, How Development of America’s Water Infrastructure Has Lurched 
Through History, PEW RESEARCH TRUST: TRENDS (Mar. 13, 2019), https://trend. 
pewtrusts.org/en/archive/spring-2019/how-development-of-americas-water-infrastructure-
has-lurched-through-history [https://perma.cc/8435-W4HR] (reporting that climate change 
is making worsening water quantity and quality and analyzing how lack of investment in 
infrastructure decreases water quality making water not safe to drink); David Shaper, As 
Infrastructure Crumbles, Trillions Of Gallons Of Water Lost, All Things Considered, NPR 
(2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/10/29/359875321/as-infrastructure-crumbles-trillions-of-
gallons-of-water-lost [https://perma.cc/J46S-5LC9]. 
 59. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, 2017 INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD: DRINKING WATER 
1 (2017), https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Drinking-
Water-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/XY2F-P6SW]. 
 60. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, 2017 INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD: WASTEWATER 1 
(2017), https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Wastewater-
Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/QH6P-NZGU]. 
 61. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, supra note 59, at 1. “$1 trillion is necessary to maintain 
and expand service to meet demands over the next 25 years.” Id. 
 62. Interview with Raul A. Deju, Partner, Brightstar Capital Partners, https://bright 
starcapitalpartners.com/private-equity-opportunities-water-infrastructure-development/ 
[https://perma.cc/3S7X-EKRD]; TASK FORCE ON FINANCING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE, A  
TYPOLOGY OF WATER INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTORS, WORLD WATER COUNCIL (2018), 
https://www.worldwatercouncil.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/Investor_Typology.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/9HLH-6JV7].  
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water supply is going to drop an additional 10% due to climate change 
related impacts.63 The straightforward impacts of climate change are 
well known: a raise in temperature translates into more evaporation 
of water and more droughts because of a decrease in rainfall and snow-
pack.64 Less obvious is the decrease in available, clean freshwater as a 
result of the decrease in water quality.65 Increased precipitation in cer-
tain areas will translate to more pollution runoff.66 Additionally, raised 
water temperatures create stress on the ecosystem and allow algae to 
bloom.67 The World Economic Forum rated water crisis as the greatest 
risk we are facing globally.68 Furthermore, a rise in sea level increases 
the amount of saltwater intrusion in our coastal aquifers making 
groundwater not fit for potable uses unless it is treated.69  
 While some may deny climate change,70 the market certainly has 
not. Scarce products are valuable, and water is no different. Market 
actors have seized the opportunity and have been investing in all 
things water, as the next section will explain. However, that market 
allocation must have a role to play in water is not the same as saying 
it is like oil. Water is renewable but irreplaceable.  
  
 
 63. Nigell Arnell & Chunzhen Liu, Hydrology and Resources, in CLIMATE CHANGE  
2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 191, 213–14 tbl. 4–6 (James McCarthy et 
al. eds., 2001), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/WGII_TAR_full_report-2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CG2U-FAER]. 
 64. Water and Climate Change, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (June 24, 2010), 
https://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/science-and-impacts/impacts/water-and-climate-
change.html [https://perma.cc/5NNX-H94S]. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Carl Ganter, Water Crises Are a Top Global Risk, WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 16, 2015), 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/01/why-world-water-crises-are-a-top-global-risk/ 
[https://perma.cc/6EKP-MYDC].  
 69. CAROLINAS INTEGRATED SCIS. & ASSESSMENTS & S.C. SEA GRANT CONSORTIUM,  
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF SALTWATER INTRUSION IN THE CAROLINAS UNDER FUTURE  
CLIMATIC AND SEA LEVEL CONDITIONS 7–8 (2012), https://cpo.noaa.gov/sites/cpo/ 
Projects/RISA/2013/reports/2012_CISAandSCSeaGrant_SalinitySARPReport.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/KNU5-6263]. 
 70. Mike Murphy, Trump Tells ‘60 Minutes’ Climate Change Will Reverse Itself and He 
Doesn’t Want to Lose Jobs Fighting It, MARKET WATCH (Oct. 15, 2018, 9:50 AM), https://www. 
marketwatch.com/story/from-climate-change-to-china-to-kavanaugh-heres-what-trump-
told-60-minutes-2018-10-14 [https://perma.cc/J6X4-C6TG]; Riley E. Dunlap & Aaron M. 
McCright, Climate Change Denial: Sources, Actors and Strategies, in CONSTANCE LEVER-
TRACY, ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIETY 240 (2010). 
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III.   THE BUSINESS OF WATER: ALL BUT WATER? 
A.   “Traditional Markets” in Water 
This idea of water as an essential part of society is often reflected 
in broad constitutional declarations about water belonging to the  
public.71 To a great extent, governmental management logically follows 
the publicness of water. In an ideal world, it is expected that govern-
ment will manage water quantity and quality for present and future 
generations, not excluding the poorest members of society. However, 
governments have often been unable to allocate water efficiently and 
fairly.72 Many have advocated for water markets as a tool to help  
resolve the shortcomings of the government’s allocation of water 
rights, particularly in water scarce regions.73 Governments have had a 
hard time reallocating existing water rights because those property 
rights are legally entrenched and because, almost everywhere, the  
political economy disfavors the reallocation.74 Plenty of water rights 
were established a long time ago when agriculture was the main  
economic activity.75 As such, even today, most water is allocated to the 
agricultural sector even though the weight of agriculture in terms of 
gross domestic product has been substantially reduced: from 37.5% in 
1869 to 0.8% in 2006.76 While it is undeniable that the agricultural 
sector requires water as an input in most cases while other sectors do 
not, the agricultural sector is heavily criticized because it is not always 
efficient.77 In the western United States, where water is scarce, there 
are few mechanisms to impose efficient practices on water users.  
Water rights are defined according to the volume historically diverted 
and put to beneficial use.78 Hence, some rights are defined according 
 
 71. Joseph Regalia & Noah D. Hall, Waters of the State, 59 NAT. RES. J. 59, 68 (2019). 
 72. CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 22–28 (comparing administrative systems and mar-
kets. The latter aggregate information better and are less subject to interest group capture); 
see also James L. Huffman, Institutional Constraints on Transboundary Marketing, in WA-
TER MARKETING. THE NEXT GENERATION, at 32 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter Jensen Hill eds., 
1997). 
 73. Mateen Thobani, Tradable Property Rights to Water. How to Improve Water Use 
and Resolve Water Conflicts, THE WORLD BANK: VIEWPOINT, no. 34, Feb. 1995, at 1; Henning 
Bjornlund & Jennifer M. McKay, Aspects of Water Markets for Developing Countries: Expe-
riences from Australia, Chile, and the U.S., 7 J. ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 767 (2002); ANDERSON 
& SNYDER, supra note 27; see also Thompson, supra note 45. 
 74. ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 27, at 21; Morris, supra note 36, at 993. 
 75. Zachary Donohew, Property Rights and Western United States Water Markets, J. 
AG. & RES. ECON. 85, 89 (2009).  
 76. JULIAN M. ALSTON ET AL., PERSISTENCE PAYS: U.S. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY 
GROWTH AND THE BENEFITS FROM PUBLIC R&D SPENDING 11–12 (2010). 
 77. Farms Waste Most of World’s Water, WIRED (Mar. 19, 2006), https://www.wired.com/ 
2006/03/farms-waste-much-of-worlds-water/ [https://perma.cc/4SMH-XTU2]. 
 78. BARTON THOMPSON, JR. ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 169 (5th ed. 
2012). 
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to the amount of water needed to flood irrigate a field of cereal in 
1890.79 Today we could probably use a center-pivot irrigation system 
which would require far less water.80 But farmers who hold old water 
rights may not have an incentive to do so. These farmers may have 
very old water rights and in prior appropriation—a system based on 
the premise “first in time, first in right”—81they will be the first to re-
ceive water if there is not enough for everyone. Using flood irrigation 
today is not considered a violation of the beneficial use requirement 
because farming is still a type of beneficial use, and the requirement 
does not impose a particular irrigation method.82 Not only it does not 
impose an efficient irrigation system, it may discourage the voluntary 
adoption of efficient systems. Prior appropriation rights are subject to 
a “use it or lose it” principle which implies that a farmer may be wary 
of shifting irrigation systems if he is going to use less water because 
he may lose the water he is not using.83 While the forfeiture based on 
“use it or lose it” aims at preventing speculation, the unintended  
consequence is that it pushes farmers to use all their right even if  
they could do without some. 
Making water rights transferable gives incentives to farmers  
to use less water and sell the rest to whoever values it most.84 Hence, 
farmers may shift toward more efficient irrigation practices if  
either water is too scarce and they do not get enough or if they can 
profit from transferring their surplus water. In other words, a market 
achieves this efficient allocation because it gives incentives to  
low-value users to sell their water to higher-value users because  
low-value users may get a higher benefit selling the water than  
using it.85 The paradigmatic transaction is between the agricultural 
sector, where historically most water has been allocated, and urban 
areas, where water is highly valued. Some farmers may fallow  
their fields and not produce in order to sell water, but others will  
just invest in efficient irrigation methods.86 Some farmers may even 
 
 79. Id. at 171 (explaining the principle of first in time, first in right); ADLER ET AL., 
supra note 22, at 121–29. In particular, the case Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strath-
more Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972 (Cal. 1935), offers an example of how prior appropriation 
rights operate. 
 80. Andy Oerman, Flood Irrigation vs. Center Pivot Irrigation (Feb. 22, 2018), 
http://blog.valleyirrigation.com/valley-irrigation/us/mediaroom/growing-the-conversation-
blog/blog-home/flood-irrigation-vs.-center-pivot-irrigation [https://perma.cc/Y3EN-L26Q]. 
 81. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 78, at 171.  
 82. Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Water, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for 
Efficiency in Western Water Law, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 934, 975–76 (1998).  
 83. PETER W. CULP ET AL., SHOPPING FOR WATER: HOW THE MARKET CAN MITIGATE WA-
TER SHORTAGES IN THE AMERICAN WEST, HAMILTON PROJECT 16 (Brookings ed. 2013).  
 84. Id. at 7.  
 85. CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 10, 23–24. 
 86. CULP ET AL., supra note 83, at 22.  
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innovate in other ways such as producing dry-farming, a technique 
that withdraws irrigation of crops beyond the seedling stage.87  
Water rights markets are not free markets though. They are very 
different than the markets for commodities.88 The nature of water and 
the water distribution system implies that a free water market may 
suffer from failures.89 The visible hand of government is necessary  
for a water rights market to work. This intervention translates to  
rules ensuring that parties to a transaction do not cause negative ex-
ternalities to third parties or the environment.90 Changes in water 
rights are subject to the no-injury rule.91 In addition, government  
undertakes functions that enhance water markets by providing  
information on transactions or offering a water rights registry.92  
Finally, it is important to note that water markets are a mechanism  
of adjustment, not the main tool to allocate water rights.  
It is important to note that these traditional water markets are in-
herently local. They are local as a result of the natural characteristics 
of water and, sometimes, regulation.93 Water, compared to other  
commodities, has natural ways to transport itself: rivers. But when 
those rivers do not connect areas with different valuation of water,  
we need man made infrastructure. Man-made infrastructure is truly 
 
 87. Ari Levaux, Is Dry Farming the Next Wave in a Drought-Plagued World?, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/people-and-culture/food/ 
the-plate/2016/09/can-dry-farming-lead-the-way-out-of-drought-/ [https://perma.cc/H8BG-
V3P4]. 
 88. Jedidiah Brewer et al., Water Markets in the West: Prices, Trading, and Contractual 
Forms 3 (NBER Working Paper Series, Paper No. 13002, 2007), http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w13002. 
 89. CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 37–39. 
 90. Id. at 66. 
 91. ADLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 154–155.  
 92. CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 10, 23–24. 
 93. ELLEN HANAK, WHO SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SELL WATER IN CALIFORNIA? THIRD-
PARTY ISSUES AND THE WATER MARKET iii (2003) (describing how counties have enacted  
regulation to control transfers of water from their jurisdiction to others); Gary D. Libecap, 
Water Rights and Markets in the U.S. Semiarid West, Efficiency and Equity Issues in PROP-
ERTY IN LAND AND OTHER RESOURCES 389, 390 (Daniel H. Cole & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2012) 
(“Most western water markets are local. Trading is confined within water basins and sectors 
(among adjacent irrigators, for example). Typically, exchange outside a water basin is  
limited, and voluntary private transactions to move water from agriculture to urban use  
are often very costly and, in some cases, extremely contentious. There is virtually no private 
water trading across state boundaries”); KATHLEEN HARTNETT WHITE ET AL., THE CASE  
FOR A TEXAS WATER MARKET 12 (2017), https://files.texaspolicy.com/uploads/2018/08/ 
16103756/2017-04-RR-WaterMarkets-ACEE-KHartnettWhite.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6CA-
JPML] (describing how groundwater districts have tried to prevent exports of groundwater); 
CULP ET AL., supra note 83, at 16 (describing the obstacles that irrigation districts put to 
farmers trying to transfer the water). 
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expensive.94 Water is far more expensive to transfer than energy or 
gas.95 The cost of transporting it 100 kilometers represents about 50% 
of the wholesale cost of water, while the equivalent is 2.5% for natural 
gas and 5% for electricity.96  
In fact, transportation costs make some of the deals less attractive. 
T. Boone Pickens, via his company Mesa Inc., wanted to make billions 
out of the Ogallala River by quenching the thirst of the ever-growing 
Dallas–Fort Worth Metroplex and San Antonio, but he could not find 
buyers.97 T. Boone Pickens managed to get the Texas Legislature to 
allow him to create the Roberts County Fresh Water Supply District 
No.1 and via the District, got eminent domain powers to condemn the 
land it needed for pipelines between the Texas Panhandle and Dallas98 
But, transportation costs were prohibitive.99 He could not find a buyer 
even during the 2009 extreme drought Texas suffered.100 While he 
claimed to be patiently waiting for the market to peak,101 he ended up 
selling the water rights to the Canadian River Water Authority, which 
serves, among others, the City of Amarillo in the Texas panhandle, for 
over $100 million.102 Not a bad deal, but not an incredible one either.  
Accordingly, water markets are naturally more local. That does not 
mean that water moguls may not have a role to play. For example, if 
someone were to find a huge aquifer near a growing urban area, she 
would certainly enter into good deals. However, water markets are 
also local because, as Section V.B. explains, communities are trying  
to protect the basin and their economic life by restricting how much 
water can be transferred out of the basin or by making the procedure 
to get approval to transfer water very onerous. Furthermore, the  
 
 94. Yuan Zhou & Richard S. J. Tol, Evaluating the costs of desalination and water 
transport, 41 WATER RESOUR. RES. 7–8 (2005) (reviewing the literature on water transpor-
tation costs to estimate the costs of transporting desalinated water); Rachel Layne, Water 
Costs Are Rising Across the U.S.—Here's Why, CBS NEWS: MONEYWATCH (Aug. 27,  
2019, 3:10 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/water-bills-rising-cost-of-water-creating-
big-utility-bills-for-americans/ [https://perma.cc/3FWT-STZK]. 
 95. Vicki Waye & Christina Son, Regulating the Australian Water Market, 22 J. ENVTL. 
L. 431, 438 (2010); see Alexander Gee, Competition and the Water Sector, ANTITRUST,  
Summer 2004, at 38, 38. 
 96. Gee, supra note 95, at 38. 
 97. PRUD’HOMME, supra note 46, at 262–64. 
 98. Id. at 263. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 264–65 
 101. Id. at 265. 
 102. Pickens, Texas Water Supplier Sign $103M Deal, BEAUMONT ENTERPRISE (June 23, 
2011, 4:05 PM), https://www.beaumontenterprise.com/news/article/Pickens-Texas-water-
supplier-sign-103M-deal-1437581.php [https://perma.cc/4CCZ-UXQH]. The Canadian River 
Water Authority’s board of directors is composed of seventeen members appointed by the 
cities the Water Authority serves. Board of Directors, CANADIAN RIVER MUN. WATER AUTH., 
https://www.crmwa.com/board-of-directors [https://perma.cc/93S9-5EF4]. 
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no-injury rule may make transactions more local since, as soon as a 
transaction sends water far away, the potential for environmental and 
third-party externalities increases.103 An illustration of this is the 
transactions that, in California, required water to pass through the 
San Joaquin and Sacramento River Deltas.104 These would be most 
transactions from the humid North to the arid South in the Golden 
State. All of these transactions are subject to a heightened scrutiny.  
While traditional water markets are not exempt from problems, wa-
ter markets understood broadly are much more challenging. While 
sometimes these water markets just enhance the negative effects pred-
icated of traditional water markets, they also present new challenges 
as next section will highlight.  
B.   Privatization of Water Utilities 
Following the same line of reasoning that counsels the introduction 
of water markets, many defend water utilities privatization. Those 
who defend privatization argue that private actors do a better job  
than local authorities in ensuring the water supply for urban  
areas.105 Governmental entities find access to financing challenging  
for the large sums of capital needed to update water infrastructure.106 
If public authorities were to embark on such an investment, rates 
would have to increase considerably. In contrast, a private provider 
can access funding and provide water more efficiently, and, thus, 
cheaply.107 Furthermore, privatization is perceived by some as making  
 
  
 
 103. Libecap, supra note 94, at 402.  
 104. CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., GUIDE TO WATER TRANSFERS Figure 1 (1999) 
(if transfers have to go through CALFED—the entity managing the Sacramento-San 
Joaquin Delta—the transaction is subject to further requirements.).  
 105. Adam Millsap, Privatizing Water Facilities Can Help Cash-Strapped Municipali-
ties, FORBES (Oct. 5 2016, 9:59 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adammillsap/2016/10/05/ 
privatizing-water-facilities-can-help-cash-strapped-municipalities/#2b46c5734b5c [https:// 
perma.cc/T2VY-7ZL9]. 
 106. Lakis Polycarpou, What is the Benefit of Privatizing Water?, COLUMBIA UNIV.: 
STATE OF THE PLANET (Sept. 2, 2010), https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2010/09/02/what-is-the-
benefit-of-privatizing-water/ [https://perma.cc/F5GJ-NWEU].  
 107. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Climate Disruption, The Washington Consensus, and Water 
Law Reform, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 383, 402–04 (2008). 
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water policy less subject to corruption and interest group influence.108 
In contrast, those critiquing it consider that privatization agreements 
are themselves the result of corruption.109 
Privatization usually takes three different forms.110 First, complete 
privatization, a model followed by the United Kingdom, implies full 
ownership of the delivery and treatment systems.111 Second, long-term 
concessions, like the French model, are schemes where the private 
company takes over the operation and maintenance of the water deliv-
ery and sewage infrastructure. In this model, the company is in charge 
of charging consumers to recover the cost and make a profit.112 Last, 
there is the model where the government contracts a company to run 
the system for a previously agreed fee.113 Privatization has often not 
met expectations, and some cities, such as Paris, have backpedaled.114  
Opposition to water privatization rallies people everywhere.115 In 
the developing world, the World Bank required privatization of water 
utilities in order to access the water loans offered by the international 
organization.116 There, often, privatization was not well received, as 
the most well-known example, the Cochabamba water wars,117 illus-
trates. The anti-privatization movement was not wrong in fearing that 
water rates would increase. In practice, the privatization of utilities 
has produced uneven results. The promise of lower rates and necessary 
 
 108. JAMES SALZMAN, DRINKING WATER: A HISTORY 201 (2013); see also PETER H. 
GLEICK ET AL., THE NEW ECONOMY OF WATER: THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF GLOBALIZATION 
AND PRIVATIZATION OF FRESH WATER 28 (2002) (reviewing Mexico’s corrupt public provision 
of tankered water). 
 109. John Vidal, Water Privatisation: A Worldwide Failure?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 30, 2015, 
8:09 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jan/30/water-privatisa-
tion-worldwide-failure-lagos-world-bank [https://perma.cc/M463-PEJ4]; see also K. Bayliss, 
Privatization and Poverty: The Distributional Impact of Utility Privatization, 73 ANNALS 
PUB. & COOPERATIVE ECON. 603, 619 (2002); GLEICK ET AL., supra note 108, at 42. 
 110. BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 9, at 89. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Bernard Barraqué, Return of Drinking Water Supply in Paris to Public Control, 14 
WATER POL’Y 903, 903–04 (2012). 
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investment has not been fulfilled.118 Often, rates have gone up.119 In 
addition, the need to provide safe drinking water to the low-income 
population requires cross-subsidization.120  
Opposition to water privatization has become a central tenet of the 
anti-globalization movement.121 For example, the left-wing populist 
Five Star Movement in Italy had opposition to privatization of water 
as one of their five pillars.122 Closer, in Felton, a town on the California 
coast, Friends of Locally Owned Water organized bake sales, dances, 
and marches against the private companies that had acquired control 
of the town’s water system and planned to increase rates to fund in-
frastructure improvements.123 
For the United States, a bit of history is illuminating. While in 
many U.S. cities, private companies were initially the suppliers of  
water, local governments soon took over.124 Starting in the 1890s, the 
number of public municipal suppliers became higher than private 
ones.125 Today 33 of 52 states and territories have more public than 
private water systems, and 50 of 52 states and territories have a larger 
portion of their population served by public water systems.126 The pen-
dulum of history swings though. Some cities with public water utilities 
privatized them only to then have to buy them again when the auspi-
cious expectations of better service were not realized. A well-known 
case is Atlanta.127 In 1999, United Water, a filial of Suez North  
America, and Atlanta entered into a deal.128 United Water was  
supposed to manage Atlanta’s water system until 2019.129 In 2003, the 
 
 118. GLEICK ET AL.,  supra note 108, at 30. 
 119. Id.  
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city backpedaled.130 United could not offer reliable service.131 The  
challenges that the disrepair of the system posed were too large for 
this to be profitable without a huge price spike. 132 
While opposition to privatization has been strong, privatization of 
some water functions and the public nature of water do not need to  
be at odds. If they did, even water use rights in the hands of private 
individuals could be subject to the same critique. Privatization efforts 
are not going away. The focus, thus, should be on making privatization 
compatible with the publicness inherent to water,133 as a report by the 
Pacific Institute does.134 This report proposes several requirements for 
water privatization agreements. The agreements must ensure, among 
others, that: (i) every person must receive a certain amount of water 
because water is a social good, (ii) water must be managed based on 
sound economic principles -for example, companies need to exhaust all 
water conservation measures before new investment to increase sup-
ply is allowed, (iii)  public agencies should keep control over water.135  
Beyond these requirements, it is important to recognize that  
privatization does not necessarily mean competition. It is often said 
that the market will cure many of the evils of government regulation 
but for that to happen the market should be a competitive one.136  
Competition keeps companies in check. None of these privatization 
models per se guarantee competition in the water market beyond the 
initial competitive bids—assuming more than one company presents 
their offers—for the long-term contracts with local governments. Often 
the companies who bid are one of the few water giants.137 For that, 
markets should be open to multiple companies, and water infrastruc-
ture should be regulated as a natural monopoly, as we have done in 
power markets in some areas, like most of Texas.138 In those markets, 
any company can ship their power or water through pipelines or 
 
 130. Id. 
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electric lines that someone else owns without being discriminated 
against by having to pay higher prices.139 England and Wales’s  
water markets are open for competition under the monitoring of the 
independent energy entity Ofwat.140 But the British example is the  
exception more than the rule. Hence, privatization alone cannot bring 
all the consumer benefits predicated from markets. Without imple-
menting a full-fledged, albeit not unregulated, market, governments 
should monitor more the performance of the private companies in 
charge of their water systems. One way to do so is by implementing 
benchmark regulations where you hold a local water company, de facto 
operating a monopoly, accountable by comparing it with its peers.141 
Benchmark regulation is also a way to fulfill the governmental control 
that the Pacific Institute’s report defends.142  
C.   New Investment in Water Market:  
Water-related Businesses 
At the end of the movie The Big Short, we learned that Michael 
Burry, who shorted Wall Street’s financial sector, was moving to  
water.143 These investments are indeed taking place in 2019. Invest-
ment funds, international corporations and wealthy businessmen are 
making true the aphorism “water is the new oil.”144 Market actors are 
profiting from climate change by investing in an asset—water—that is 
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tle of a flyer used by those opposing the bill that would have blocked a major groundwater 
transaction between the farming company Cadiz Inc. in the Mohave Desert and Southern 
California urban centers. The flyer claimed that those favoring the bill and opposing the 
transaction had only in mind their own profits as they were betting against the company  
on the financial markets and benefited from the decrease in Cadiz’s stock price. Ian James 
& Evan Wyloge, Bill Targeting Company’s Plan to Pump Desert Groundwater Dies in  
California Senate, DESERT SUN (Aug. 31, 2018, 7:56 PM), https://www.desertsun.com/ 
story/news/environment/2018/08/31/bill-would-hinder-cadiz-water-project-stalls-california-
senate/1158059002/ [https://perma.cc/8ZXB-3LXX]. 
 144. Another way to put it is that “blue is the new green.” SALZMAN, supra note 108, at 
22. 
 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:201 
 
222 
going to become more and more valuable. So far, the investment has 
focused on all things water but water itself, but this is also changing, 
and investors are trying to invest in water rights.  
As a result of water scarcity and the consequent business opportu-
nities, we expect the large, established, international water players to 
invest in water in the United States. For example, Suez Lyonnaise, the 
global leader in water, has been a player since 1999, when it acquired 
control of United Water, a water distribution business.145 Parallel to 
this, some companies or wealthy individuals have diversified their 
portfolio of products to include water business lines. Examples of this 
diversification are General Electric146 and oil tycoons, like T. Boone 
Pickens.147 Plenty of business sectors are in a position to benefit from 
climate change. Beyond bottled water and water utilities, companies 
manufacturing water-efficient appliances or water purification  
systems are expected to do better thanks to climate change.148  
Even individual investors are seeking to invest in companies engag-
ing in water-related businesses.149 These individual investors can in-
vest in traditional international water companies like the well-known 
French company Suez or the less well-known U.S. company, PICO 
Holdings,150 new entrants in the water business like General Electric, 
or identify the companies in the specialized indexes like Dow Jones 
U.S. Water Index.151 This index is composed of 29 stocks including 
Aqua America and California Water Service Group, both water utili-
ties holding companies that operate subject to the regulation of public 
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utilities commissions in several states such as: Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
Texas, California, New Mexico, Hawaii, and Washington.152 Another 
index that we can use as an example is the S&P Global Water Index, 
which traces fifty water utilities and water infrastructure companies 
around the world. S&P Global Water Index153 includes companies from 
water utilities, to a company producing flushing systems and pipes 
(Geberit Group)154 and Danaher, a conglomerate which has water  
diagnosis and purification among its lines of business.155  
Beyond direct investment, there are some exchange-traded funds—
investment funds that are traded in stock exchanges and that hold  
different company stocks—devoted to water companies.156 Investors  
often use these commodity-based funds to hedge their investments  
in other assets.157 The most prominent water exchange-traded fund is 
Invesco Water Resources, with $865 million in assets under manage-
ment in 2018, with a focus only on U.S. water-related companies, 
among them Danaher Corporation.158 Other funds are Invesco S&P 
Global Water ETF, which tracks the S&P Global Water Index,159 and 
the Invesco Global Water ETF, which focuses on water conservation 
and purification companies.160  
 All this investment has proven wrong the claims about water regu-
lation deterring investment and stifling innovation.161 In fact, there 
are even start-ups focused on water innovation.162 As with almost any 
product, when value goes up, investment flows into water.   
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D.   Investing in Water as an Asset 
1. New Forms of Water: Desalination, Reuse 
As water becomes scarce, technology once again steps in to save the 
day.163 For a long time, engineers dominated water policy.164 Dams 
were built everywhere to smooth the annual supply of water by storing 
winter and spring rains for those times of the year when it rains 
less.165While they did not increase water supply in terms of overall 
quantity, they did ensure that more of it could be effectively used when 
needed.166 Dams are now disfavored given their environmental conse-
quences.167 But we are back at often believing that technology will pave 
our way out of water scarcity by increasing supply, particularly 
through desalination and water reuse technologies. 
Desalination is the technique of transforming ocean water into po-
table water for our everyday uses.168 Desalination can also be applied 
to brackish groundwater.169 Texas, California, and Florida, three of the 
four states that consume the most freshwater, have turned to the 
ocean to solve their water scarcity problems.170 Desalination is not 
without negative environmental consequences: from the effect on 
ocean currents, to the high volume of energy it consumes, to what  
to do with the brine.171 Desalination is still a small part of the water 
supply,172 but it is a growing industry.173 
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 Similarly, recycled water is a growing source of water. Although all 
water is reused given the hydrological circle,174 water reuse refers to 
further treating wastewater so that it can be put to potable uses either 
by subjecting it to, among other processes, reverse osmosis, filtration, 
and UV radiation systems,175 or by complementing those with an envi-
ronmental buffer.176 The former is direct potable reuse and, the latter, 
indirect potable reuse because the recycled water is not immediately 
pumped back into the system, but discharged into a lake, river, or  
aquifer.177 For example, in Texas, water reuse is an increasingly  
important source of water.178 The 2017 State Water Plan expects reuse 
to cover more than 14% of the annual demand of water by 2070, as it 
will be more affordable than other sources, including in some areas, 
water conservation.179  
 Municipal water suppliers are likely to invest in both desalina-
tion180 and reuse in the near future, particularly as they become price 
competitive.181 Companies are likely to invest into making these tech-
nologies cheaper and more environmentally friendly.182 These new 
sources can quench part of the increase in demand. Their presence 
lowers the value of investing in existing water rights in groundwater 
or surface water. Desalination and reuse increase supply, thus,  
lowering the price of water. However, reuse can have negative  
systemic effects as Section IV.E.2 explains. Desalination poses 
 
 174. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., WATER REUSE: POTENTIAL FOR EXPANDING 
THE NATION’S WATER SUPPLY THROUGH REUSE OF MUNICIPAL WASTEWATER 25 (2012). 
 175. NEJLAH HUMMER & SUSANNA EDEN, POTABLE REUSE OF WATER 2 (2016), 
https://watereuse.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/arroyo-2016-5-6-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
X6SG-E8M9]. 
 176. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECT. AGENCY, 2017 POTABLE REUSE COMPENDIUM i (2017), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-01/documents/potablereusecompendium_ 
3.pdf [https://perma.cc/QQJ2-ECDP]. 
 177. Ground Water and Drinking Water: Potable Water Reuse and Drinking Water,  
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ground-water-and-drinking-water/potable- 
water-reuse-and-drinking-water [https://perma.cc/5VYW-B9ZZ]. 
 178. TEX. WATER DEV. BD., 2017 STATE WATER PLAN 6–8 (2017), http://www.twdb.texas. 
gov/waterplanning/swp/2017/doc/SWP17-Water-for-Texas.pdf?d=4143 [https://perma.cc/ 
54DJ-QF2U]. 
 179. Id. at 90. 
 180. Nikolay Voutchkov, Desalination – Past, Present and Future, INT’L WATER  
ASS’N (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.iwa-network.org/desalination-past-present-future/ 
[https://perma.cc/8CXF-Q7MV] (“An expected US$10 billion investment [from 2016 to 
2021].”). 
 181. For desalination, see TEX. WATER DEV. BD., supra note 178, at 89 (predicting costs 
to get lower within five years and even more within twenty years). For reuse, see the chart 
comparing the cost of different water sources in Texas. Id. 
 182. Sarah Goodyear, Innovators Are Chasing a Cheaper Future for Desalination, NEXT 
CITY (Nov. 12, 2014), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/drought-resilience-desalination-plant-
california [https://perma.cc/MFL8-D4AM]; Kristin Majcher, How Can Desalination Become 
Cheaper?, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/532891/how-
can-desalination-become-cheaper/ [https://perma.cc/D2JF-QPVD]. 
 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:201 
 
226 
environmental risks, as it consumes lots of energy, not always  
clean, and it may affect ocean ecosystems by changing currents. Its 
brine disposal is challenging.183 
2. Groundwater  
 T. Boone Pickens, the Oklahoma-born oil tycoon, has exchanged oil 
for water. Pickens has bought 200,000 acres of land in the Texas  
panhandle to get its corresponding groundwater rights for about $75 
million. His expected return is above $1 billion by selling it to Texas’s 
ever-growing urban areas.184 But Pickens is not the only one.185 
Groundwater ranching, that is, buying “water from distant rural land-
owners for the sole purpose of exporting, or piping, water for uses 
many miles removed from the land” has been practiced for more than 
50 years in Texas186 but it has picked up. Groundwater prices in Texas 
have increased up to 344% from their level in the 2000s.187  
3. Surface Water 
 Roughly, there are two water rights regimes in the United States. 
The East follows a riparian system, and, the West, a prior appropria-
tion one.188 In a riparian system, water rights are tied with land  
ownership.189 Under this common law doctrine, the owner of riparian 
land has “the right to make reasonable use of the water, subject to  
the equal rights of other riparians on the same waterbody.”190 Thus, 
riparian water users do not own the water itself but have a usufructu-
ary right to the water.191 Riparian rights cannot be transferred  
separately from the riparian land.192 However, a riparian landowner 
could transfer the land and reserve the water rights193 or could grant 
an easement to access the water to a third party. Such an easement, 
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though, is only enforceable against the grantor.194 In regulated ripari-
anism states, that is, states where users are required to apply for a 
water use permit before an agency, the permit may be sold but only 
when title to the riparian land is transferred and only for use in the 
riparian land.195 Prior appropriation is the system of the West because 
riparianism was not fit for the challenges of arid climates.196 [Prior  
appropriation, based on the rules of mining camps,197 grants a right to 
use water to whoever puts water to beneficial use. There is no require-
ment to use it in riparian lands.198  
 Prior appropriation rights are transferable,199 provided the transfer 
does not harm third parties.200 This rule applies to old common-law 
rights as well as rights granted by an agency nowadays.201 The imple-
mentation of the no-injury rule is different though. In the case of  
old common-law prior appropriation rights, third parties affected are 
able to challenge a transaction before a court.202 For permittees, the  
procedure is a bit more cumbersome. Those who want to transfer  
the right need in most cases to ensure the approval of a water agency 
beforehand.203 While in pure prior appropriation systems there are  
no restrictions on where the water can be used, a change in the  
place of use as a result of a transfer requires approval as it may harm 
other users.204  
 Given all these regulatory controls, water agencies have often 
played the role of brokers.205 But as water markets have grown and 
become more sophisticated, private companies have also taken on that 
 
 194. Id. at 32. 
 195. Ronald G. Cummings et al., Water Rights Transfers: Options for Institutional Re-
form 9 (Ga. State Univ. Andrew Young Sch. of Policy Studies & Albany State Univ. Flint 
River Water Planning & Policy Ctr., Water Policy Working Paper No. 2001–01, 2001). 
 196. Daina Dravnieks Apple, Evolution of U.S. Water Policy: Emphasis on the West, 24 
WOMEN IN NAT. RES. 3 (2003–2004), https://www.webpages.uidaho.edu/winr/applewater. 
htm [https://perma.cc/4ZXP-7BWJ]. 
 197. A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West, 41 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 769, 770 (2001). 
 198. BRIAN GRAY ET AL., ALLOCATING CALIFORNIA’S WATER: DIRECTIONS FOR REFORM 7 
(2015), https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_1115BGR.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BP4-
JP5Y]. There are “area of origin” restrictions in California which may be copied by other 
states. Id. These restrictions “allow individuals and communities to establish new rights for 
surface water in their local watersheds. These rights are senior to those of water users who 
export water from these areas.” Id. 
 199. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 78, at 303. 
 200. Id. at 307–312. 
 201. Id.  
 202. CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 147–48. 
 203. Id., at 146–53; ADLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 156–57. 
 204. CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 147–48. 
 205. Id. at 87–89. 
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role,206 particularly as large investment in water takes place. For  
example, WaterExchange, LLC, a company that offers transaction  
advice, water rights appraisal, and market information, worked with 
a customer to execute water transactions valued at $100 million in  
Arizona.207  
 In Australia, water markets have flourished after the entitlement 
reform that occurred in that country as a result of the Millennium 
drought.208 For example, two companies have invested directly in  
water: Duxton Water Ltd.209 and Webster, which holds agricultural 
stock.210 Water is attractive because it is an asset likely to appreciate 
in the future as climate change strikes, and, because it is an asset 
mostly uncorrelated with other assets. Duxton holds entitlements to 
water just to lease them.211 It is not unthinkable that the same could 
end up taking place in the United States because legislation ensures 
that leasing water is not against beneficial use. In fact, in order to  
promote water markets, states, such as California, have enacted  
provisions clarifying that leasing a water right is not the same as not 
using it.212 Before this clarification, many irrigators were wary of  
entering into short or long term water transfers because they feared 
that water agencies would perceive trading as triggering the forfeiture 
provisions.213  As such, there is no clear legislative impediment in  
water law in the Western United States to a company acquiring water 
rights and immediately putting them to beneficial use via a lease. It 
may be worth exploring the possibilities to patch this regulatory  
gap, or, soon, we may even find someone proudly calling himself a  
“water bandit,” as David Williams, an Australian who has invested  
 
 206. See, e.g., About Us, WESTWATER RES., LLC, http://www.waterexchange.com/about-
us/ [https://perma.cc/X4VV-Q9D8].  
 207. Company Principals, WESTWATER RES., LLC, http://www.waterexchange.com/ 
about-us/company-principals/ [https://perma.cc/99YC-TE4A] (description of Matt Payne, 
Principal). 
 208. History of  Australian Water Markets, AUSTL. GOV. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Nov. 4, 2019), 
https://www.agriculture.gov.au/water/markets/history [https://perma.cc/9Q4C-GRTU]; Jose 
Bolorinos, Lessons Australia's Water Reform Offers in Science, Politics and Sustainable  
Watersheds, STANFORD: WATER IN THE WEST (Aug. 21, 2019), https://waterinthewest. 
stanford.edu/news-events/news-insights/lessons-australias-water-reform-offers-science- 
politics-and-sustainable [https://perma.cc/X6MT-G8R5]. 
 209. About, DUXTON WATER, http://www.duxtonwater.com.au  (last visited Sept. 20, 
2019). 
 210. About Webster, WEBSTER, http://www.websterltd.com.au (last visited Jan. 2, 2020).  
 211. Tim Boreham, Dipping Into Water Stocks, SHARECAFE (Sept. 19, 2018), 
https://www.sharecafe.com.au/2018/09/19/dipping-into-water-stocks/ 
[https://perma.cc/3J4C-V4TS]. 
 212. CASADO PÉREZ, supra note 3, at 135–37. 
 213. Id. at 136–37. 
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in water rights and gets a capital gain of 20% annually does.214 Up to 
8% of the water rights in the Murray-Darling basin is owned by water 
investors.215 
IV.   NEGATIVE EFFECTS FROM THE FLOW OF  
MONEY INTO WATER MARKETS 
 Money flowing into the water industry, coupled with the now  
long-standing privatization of water utilities and the growing interest 
in the water itself, is setting off the alarms. The opposition to water 
markets is nothing new. Water markets may raise efficiency, but there 
is a high risk of non-internalized negative externalities and fairness 
concerns. While everyone, from time to time, pays to drink from a fancy 
non-reusable plastic water bottle which has traveled thousands of 
miles from the spring where it originated,216 the commoditization of 
water is often criticized. Commodification is criticized because water 
is perceived as so essential and public that its allocation, to the extent 
possible, should not be subject to market mechanisms.217 Even when 
water is subject to those traditional and heavily regulated market 
mechanisms, that is, water rights exchanges, the concern for the com-
munity of origin and for low-income populations are always present.218 
Markets are expected to increase water prices and make its allocation 
efficient, but they may also price out part of the population219 and take 
water far away from its natural basin.220 These critiques are even 
stronger today when big money is investing in every facet of the water 
market. Another recently enhanced fear is that fewer players will have 
 
 214. Adam Courtenay, Water Rights, Trading and the New Water Barons, IN BLACK 
(Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.intheblack.com/articles/2017/11/01/water-rights-barons [https:// 
perma.cc/Z5JN-TUQ8]. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Christine A. Klein, Water Transfers: The Case Against Transbasin Diversions in the 
Eastern States, 25 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 249, 258 (2006). 
 217. Gleick et al., supra note 108, at 1. CULP ET AL., supra note 83, at 16. For a review 
of the normative debate, see Norman W. Spaulding III, Commodification and Its Discontents: 
Environmentalism and the Promise of Market Incentives, 16 STAN. ENVT’L. L. J. 293 (1997); 
see also Michael C. Blumm, The Fallacies of Free Market Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 371, 375 (1992).  
 218. Vanessa Casado Perez, Whose Water? Corporatization of a Common Good, in EN-
VTL. L. DISRUPTED (forthcoming Environmental Law Institute) (on file with the author); HA-
NAK, supra note 93, at 4–6, 81 (“[S]tudies also demonstrate that there can be significant 
localized negative effects on individual farm workers and businesses and on local public 
agencies such as school districts. Thus, there may be ethical grounds for devising mitigation 
programs, even when a transfer does not trigger the legal requirement to do so. The case for 
mitigation is stronger when the transfer has negative distributional implications—a concen-
tration of losses to low-income farm workers and processing plant laborers and accrual of 
most benefits to the relatively wealthy members of the community (or, in the case of absentee 
landlords, nonmembers).”). 
 219. Gleick et al., supra note 108, at iv. 
 220. CULP ET AL., supra note 83, at 16.  
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the power to decide the fate of our water.221 Furthermore, while the 
traditional exchange of water rights is subject to some restrictions and 
controls, new forms of investment in water are not considering nega-
tive externalities to third parties. They manage to exploit the gaps in 
the system. Either these transactions that happen in water markets 
broadly understood may not be subject to the same scrutiny than  
traditional water rights exchanges, or they benefit from gaps in the 
regulation. In addition, these new forms of investment bring other 
types of concerns, such as disgust at these companies for investing in 
water and benefiting from their own misconduct that contributes to 
climate change.  
 The following subsection starts with precisely this last concern, the 
moral wrong that companies, which contribute to climate change, com-
mit when profiting from a thriving market thanks to water scarcity. 
Then, it moves to distributional concerns: the struggles of the low- 
income population to afford more expensive water and the potential 
concentration in water markets. Finally, it deals with those gaps in 
the regulatory system that permit some of the profitable exchanges in 
water markets: the poor regulation of groundwater and the regulation 
of water reuse. This Article closes by analyzing how some of the  
transactions skirt a central tenet of prior appropriation while formally 
complying with the regulations.  
A.   Profiting from One’s Own Misconduct 
 The investment of energy companies, such as the defunct Enron 
through its subsidiary Azurix222 or oil tycoons, in water as an asset in 
itself reminds us of Riggs v. Palmer, the New York case where a grand-
son was not allowed to inherit from his grandfather because he had 
murdered him.223 Those who have profited from creating climate 
change should not be allowed to profit from the business opportunities 
that its negative consequences create.224 A similar statement could be 
 
 221. James Laughlin, Water Market Continues Growth Despite Global Recession,  
WATER WORLD (Dec. 1, 2009), https://www.waterworld.com/international/wastewater/ 
article/16200533/water-market-continues-growth-despite-global-recession [https://perma. 
cc/G983-CSEB]; BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 9, at 101–53. 
 222. See generally PUB. CITIZEN’S CRITICAL MASS ENERGY & ENV’T PROGRAM, LIQUID  
ASSETS: ENRON'S DIP INTO WATER BUSINESS HIGHLIGHTS PITFALLS OF PRIVATIZATION (2002), 
https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/liquidassets.pdf. 
 223. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889). For commentary on Riggs, see gen-
erally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
 224. The aim of this section is not to vilify oil companies. Some European oil companies 
stepped up their game around the Paris Climate Agreement and formed the Oil and Gas 
Climate Initiative (OGCI) pledging to reduce emissions and to explore new business models. 
Georg Kell, Big Oil and Climate Leadership—An Oxymoron?, FORBES (Sept. 18, 2018,  
2:51 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgkell/2018/09/18/big-oil-and-climate-leadership-
an-oxymoron/#4a2754fa624f. 
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made about those selling water to fracking companies at a high  
price. While the sellers themselves may not be engaging in major  
CO2 producing activities, they are benefiting from the climate change 
induced high water price when selling to the oil and gas industry,225 
which has contributed to greenhouse gases emissions and which  
outbids traditional water users.226 While selling these companies water 
effluent227 seems better, treated effluent is still the source of water  
of many users downstream of those cities, and, thus, it creates  
externalities.  
 The sale or lease of water rights by farmers has been frowned  
upon too. For years, they have received subsidized water that makes 
the desert bloom, and they have not been using that water effi-
ciently.228 While there have been advances in building some push  
toward efficiency in prior appropriation doctrines, such as the use  
of water duties,229 there is still room for improvement. Markets  
allow them to profit from this past inefficient behavior funded by  
the taxpayers by selling water to urbanites.230 
B.   Community Externalities  
 Water markets may be expected to ensure that water ends up in  
the hands of those who value it more. This means, though, that the 
communities where that water comes from no longer have access to it 
and may not have access to the jobs that were making use of that water 
or to the economic activity depending on farming orders.231 These 
 
 225. Maxx Chatsko, 1 Unexpected Stock that Could Cash in on the Permian Basin Oil 
Surge, MOTLEY FOOL (Apr. 9, 2018, 6:02 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/04/09/1-
unexpected-stock-that-could-cash-in-on-the-permi.aspx. 
 226. Russell Gold & Ana Campoy, Oil’s Growing Thirst for Water, WALL STREET  
J. (Dec. 6, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204528204577009930 
222847246. 
 227. Jennifer Hiller, Companies Try Selling Effluent Water in the Eagle Ford, SAN  
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Mar. 9, 2013, 5:05 PM), https://www.mysanantonio.com/ 
business/article/Companies-try-selling-effluent-water-in-the-Eagle-4342096.php. 
 228. CULP ET AL., supra note 83, at 10. 
 229. State Dep’t of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Wash. 1993). In an adjudi-
cation, the referee curtailed the right the Grimes claimed based on historical usage by ap-
plying a water duty—an estimation of the amount of water needed for a particular crop—
corrected by an efficiency factor. Id. The Court upheld the reduction. Id. at 1046–48. It stated 
that “the amount of water necessary for a beneficial use” will be limited to a reasonable 
amount for the particular purpose. Id. at 1049. A particular use must not only be of benefit 
to the appropriator, but it must also be a reasonable and economical use of the water in view 
of other present and future demands upon the source of supply. Id. For a commentary on 
Grimes, see David H. Getches, Changing the River’s Course: Western Water Policy Reform, 
26 ENVTL. L. 157, 161–63 (1996). 
 230. Passell, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
 231. The experience of Carson County is illustrative. Before the county’s groundwater 
was exported there were new car-dealers and two farm-equipment providers. After the water 
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communities lose out on all of this without any decision-making  
power on their part.232 An individual farmer or farm company selling 
water might not have communitarian preferences233 and may only  
consider her own gain. This type of externality to the community is  
not exclusive to the transfer of water rights. Individual transfer quotas 
in fisheries also raised similar problems in ports where the economy  
is not diversified, and the quotas may translate into unemployment  
for the crews.234 
 A part of the scholarship rejects these community externalities—
also labeled pecuniary externalities—because they believe that the ef-
fects on the economy and life of a region beyond the parties to a water 
transfer are no different from any other economic transaction with 
winners and losers.235 In other words, for them, water being relocated 
is no different than a manufacturing plant relocating from the  
Rustbelt to China.  
 In practice, though, compensation for these community externali-
ties has occurred in water transactions. Some scholars acknowledge 
the controversies regarding the definition of pecuniary externalities 
and accept that it is politically necessary to take them into account, 
but conceive of compensation in such cases as transitional, that is, 
funds allocated to mitigate these issues should be temporary in order 
to encourage efficient behavior.236 A transitional remedy might train 
workers to shift to other business sectors in the area or take the form 
of general assistance measures directed to improving the economic  
tissue of the region.237  
 
was gone, the one farm-equipment provided struggle to make Joe Nick Patoski, Boone  
Pickens Wants to Sell You His Water, TEX. MONTHLY (Jan. 20, 2013), https://www. 
texasmonthly.com/the-culture/boone-pickens-wants-to-sell-you-his-water/. Now that the wa-
ter is gone, there are no new car-dealers and the one remaining farm-equipment provider 
struggles to stay in business. Id. 
 232. See generally Thompson, supra note 38 (analyzing the California case for water 
markets and the interplay between government rules and traditional institutions which 
tend to be reluctant to transaction with external actors); see also GLEICK, supra note 108,  
at 39; cf. Kyle Emerick & Dean Lueck, Economic Organization and the Lease-Ownership 
Decision in Water, SSRN 25 (Jan. 31, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
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 233. See generally Thompson, supra note 38; cf. Emerick & Lueck, supra note 232, at 25. 
 234. Bonnie J. McCay et al., Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) in Canadian and 
US Fisheries, 28 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 85, 94 (1995); EUGENE H. BUCK, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., 95–849 ENR, INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS IN FISHERY MANAGEMENT 
12 (1995). 
 235. Huffman, Water Marketing, supra note 36, at 432. 
 236. James J. Murphy et al., Mechanisms for Addressing Third-Party Impacts Resulting 
from Voluntary Water Transfers, in USING EXPERIMENTAL METHODS IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 91, 110 (J. List ed., 2005). 
 237. HANAK, supra note 93, at 88–94 (discussing the advantages of disadvantages of tar-
geted versus general programs). Targeted programs will devote funds to compensate those 
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 The harder effects on communities occur where sold water comes 
not from a more efficient use of the resource but from the idling of 
fields. Behind this difference is the idea that if transferred water 
comes from a more efficient use, it involves fewer consequences for 
other factors employed since production is not curtailed.238 In contrast, 
fallowing may entail unemployment for farm workers (direct effects), 
fewer business transactions for farm suppliers (indirect effects),  
and broader effects on the rural communities in general (spillover  
effects).239 All of these combined may produce a “multiplier effect.”240 
Nonetheless, the first lands put to fallow can be expected to be the  
ones producing low-value added crops and, thus, these tend not to  
employ many other inputs.241 A review of studies regarding the effects 
of fallowing between 6% and 25% of farmland in an area shows that 
such actions usually affect less than 1% of the economic activity of  
a region.242 Despite this evidence, the Model Water Transfer Act for 
California suggested taking these costs into consideration when  
approving the transaction in the review243 if the water sold comes from 
land fallowing. Given the harsher effects of fallowing and the heated 
response we may expect from communities, it should be considered 
whether public agencies should take this into account either in the  
review procedure or by establishing some ex-post mechanism. 
  
 
who are more directly affected, such as unemployed farm workers or farm suppliers. Id. at 
90. Regarding the first, a claims-based system regarding cash compensation could be envi-
sioned but high administrative costs and the political economy of the affected group disfavor 
it. Id. at 90–91. Other targeted programs include job search and training programs for laid-
off workers. Id. at 90. “General assistance might take the form of measures to improve the 
economic environment of the area, for example, infrastructure investments or reduced sales 
taxes, or might support specific projects of benefit to area residents.” Id. 
 238. Id. at 71–77 (local jurisdictions try to prevent transfers where the source of water 
is land fallowing because those have harsher effects on the economy. Where water comes 
from irrigation efficiency gains, other factors such as farm workers may remain employed 
because production is maintained).  
 239. Id. at 122–23. 
 240. See id. at 81–82 (reviewing several empirical studies on land fallowing arising from 
water transfers, other pilot or environmental programs or regulations, and simulations). 
 241. See id. at 124 (presenting the mitigating role that the mere economics on land fal-
lowing have on the potential effects on communities). 
 242. Id. at 81. 
 243. The Model Water Transfer Act is a proposal to reform California’s water law in 
order to promote market reallocation. It was drafted by academic and sponsored by, among 
others, the California Chamber of Commerce and the California Farm Bureau. Brian E. 
Gray, A Model Water Transfer Act for California, 4 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
591, 601–02 (2008). However, those defending the community dimension of water still found 
the efforts in the proposal insufficient. See Santos Gomez & Penn Loh, Communities and 
Water Markets: A Review of the Model Water Transfer Act, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y 689, 691, 707–08 (2008). 
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C.   Pricing Out Low-Income Population 
 The negative effect of the market on water allocation for low-income 
populations is the strongest argument against water markets. Water 
is a human right, and, in economics parlance, it can be understood to 
be a merit good.244 In legal parlance, many have categorized it as a 
human right.245 A price increase affects those whose disposable income 
is lower.246 Privatization, in many instances, has meant higher rates.247 
Higher water prices exacerbate other environmental injustices.248 For 
example, in a market dominated by private actors, poor communities 
may not receive reliable water delivery, if water gets delivered at all.249  
 Privatization is not the only cause of increased prices; water rights 
markets have the same effect. These water rights markets are based 
on the worthy goal of prices reflecting the true value of water.250 How-
ever, there is a new costly institutional framework composed of  
brokers and middlemen.251 What is more, profits also end in the  
hands of water rights-holders who did not pay for their rights in the 
first place.252 
D.   Market Concentration 
 Beyond the moral opposition to any sort of private investment  
commodifying water, the role of big money in water seems troublesome 
to many.253 There seems to be an implicit fear that a water market 
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FOR CALIFORNIA WATER 50 (2005), https://www.issuelab.org/resources/2885/2885.pdf. 
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Water and Sanitation Sector, 30 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 145, 166 (2005). 
 248. JOHN GIBLER, WATER FOR PEOPLE AND PLACE: MOVING BEYOND MARKETS IN  
CALIFORNIA WATER POLICY 4 (2005), https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/water-for-
people_web.pdf. 
 249. FOOD & WATER WATCH, WATER=LIFE: HOW PRIVATIZATION UNDERMINES THE HU-
MAN RIGHT TO WATER 4 (2011), https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/sites/default/files/ 
Water%20Equals%20Life%20IB%20July%202011.pdf (reviewing the case-sturdy of Ja-
karta, Indonesia, where the private company supplying water prioritized extending the ser-
vice to wealthier parts of town). 
 250. CULP ET AL., supra note 83, at 7. 
 251. Klein, supra note 216, at 259. 
  252. Ellen Hanak et al., Myths of California Water–Implications and Reality, 16 HAS-
TINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 3, 21–22 (2010) (reviewing the view of farmers as water 
villains who overuse water because they are paying a subsidized price for it. Instead of end-
ing the subsidies, the possibility of transferring water rights give the farmers the incentives 
to be efficient.).  
 253. BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 9, at 101–53. 
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where large companies are investing is a water market with fewer  
actors.254 The big multinational corporations, like Vivendi and Suez, 
which are labeled the General Motors and Ford companies of water,255 
will dominate. The concentration may trickle to other sectors too, 
among those, the agricultural one. However, it must be acknowledged 
that the concentration in related markets is not only the result of  
the new investment in water but also the long-coming changes in  
agriculture itself.256 The agricultural sector is not just composed of  
Jeffersonian yeoman farmers. Agribusiness leads the way.257  
 Setting the related markets issue aside, the question that needs  
to be asked is: what is the harm that comes from having large holders 
of water rights? Antitrust will supposedly deal with the ripple effects 
of concentration in other markets.258 If too few companies produced  
tomatoes, like some say happens in the case of bananas,259 and there 
was no competition from other countries, we would expect the Depart-
ment of Justice to take action. The same would be true if there was 
concentration in any natural resource market. However, in natural  
resources, regulations have tried to prevent the situation from arising 
in the first place by limiting the amount of a resource anyone or any 
company can possess.260 The idea behind such a limit is to ensure that 
the all-mighty private sector cannot outpower the regulatory agency 
and that it is not able to put the nation in check by controlling certain 
key natural resources.261  
 Furthermore, questions may be raised not only because water is  
in the hands of a few, but because these few are foreigners. All over 
 
 254. Id. 106–09. 
 255. Id., at 85. 
 256. Shi-Ling Hsu, Scale Economies, Scale Externalities: Hog Farming and the Chang-
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 257. Melanie J. Wender, Goodbye Family Farms and Hello Agribusiness: The Story of 
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OF AGRIC., CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE: 1940, at 68 (1940), http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/ 
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 258. Competitive Effects, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/ 
competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers/competitive-effects (last visited Nov. 22, 
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ATLANTIC (Mar. 10, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/03/big- 
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 260. See infra Section III.C.  
 261. David G. Miller, The Historical Development of Oil and Gas Laws in the United 
States, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 506, 517–18 (1963). 
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the world, countries limit foreign private investment.262 Often the  
reasons revolve around national security.263 However, the definition of 
national security is far from homogeneous.264 In some countries, like 
Canada, it even includes the idea of cultural policy.265 Given the 
threats that water scarcity and water infrastructure pose to national 
security,266 logically, investment in this area would be flagged because 
it affects critical infrastructure. Several countries recognize water  
infrastructure as key and discriminate against foreign investors in 
that area.267 The United States is no exception. The Foreign Invest-
ment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), passed in 2018, 
expanded which transactions were covered.268 Among those covered 
are transactions involving foreign, non-passive investments in U.S. 
critical infrastructure.269 Water infrastructure is certainly critical  
for U.S. national security.270 Being covered means that the Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)271 will review  
the transactions and, where appropriate, impose certain changes or 
deal restructuration.272 Furthermore, once the CFIUS concludes an  
investigation, the President could prohibit the investment, although 
he has almost never done so.273 In any event, the potential concern 
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 265. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 262, at 10. 
 266. HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 27 
(2007). 
 267. See GORDON & DION, supra note 264, at 7 (asserting that 18 out of 39 OECD coun-
tries surveyed have discriminatory policies in water and treatment systems). 
 268. H.R. 5515, 115th Cong. § 1702 (2018). 
 269. H.R. 5515, 115th Cong. § 1703(a)(5) (2018) (“(5) Critical infrastructure.—The term 
‘critical infrastructure’ means, subject to regulations prescribed by the Committee, systems 
and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity  
or destruction of such systems or assets would have a debilitating impact on national  
security.”). 
 270. Gunjan R. Talati, CFIUS Reform Is Here: What the Foreign Investment Risk Review 
Modernization Act of 2018 Means for Your Transaction, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 3, 2018), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a9797189-941b-4c0d-a8d6-e8c6a69fc53e; 
GORDON & DION, supra note 264, at 5 tbl.2. 
 271. Its composition reflects the concerns being targeted. It is composed of: (1) The Sec-
retary of the Treasury, (2) The Secretary of Homeland Security, (3) The Secretary of Com-
merce, (4) The Secretary of Defense, (5) The Secretary of State, (6) The Attorney General of 
the United States, and (7) The Secretary of Energy. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(k)(2) (2008).  
 272. Overview of the CFIUS Process, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP (2017), https://www.lw. 
com/thoughtLeadership/overview-CFIUS-process.  
 273. David Zaring, CFIUS as a Congressional Notification Service, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 81, 
87 (2009). 
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about the foreign origin of the private investment should be somewhat 
reduced. However, the worry by plenty of those who are against water 
commodification is not necessarily the security threat but the potential 
harm to consumers and, to an extent, to cultural values that define 
water as a commons.274 As such, their concern could be better captured 
by regulations recognizing cultural concerns as a reason to discrimi-
nate against foreign investment.275 
E.   Exploiting Regulatory Gaps 
1. Groundwater 
 Not all states regulate groundwater and surface water jointly,  
although they are more often than not interconnected.276 Groundwater 
is still ground zero for the tragedy of the commons in many states.277 
There are a myriad of reasons for the duality in water regulation. 
Among them is that initially there was not much knowledge about  
how groundwater operated.278 Today, the situation is probably ex-
plained by path dependence and the difficulty of regulating entrenched 
interests.279 Investing in a less regulated resource, groundwater, is an 
interesting prospect in times of water scarcity.280 Furthermore, new 
investment in water is keen on exploiting these regulatory gaps.281  
 California, often a leader in environmental matters, did not have 
much of a groundwater regulation until the last drought crisis, when, 
 
 274. BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 9, at 87. 
 275. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 262, at 8. 
 276. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 78, at 444–45. They are less connected in cases of 
confined aquifers like the Ogallala. Burke W. Griggs, General Stream Adjudications as a 
Property and Regulatory Model for Addressing the Depletion of the Ogallala Aquifer, 15 WYO. 
L. REV. 413, 417 (2015). 
 277. Richard Frank, Tragedy of the Commons–California Drought-Style, LEGAL  
PLANET (July 13, 2015), http://legal-planet.org/2015/07/13/tragedy-of-the-commons- 
california-drought-style/. 
 278. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 78, at 444. 
 279. Dave Owen, Taking Groundwater, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 253, 256-58 (2013) (explain-
ing how groundwater regulation responds to the situation before current times and how  
takings doctrine may disincentive states to regulate existing rights); Robert G. Varady  
et al., Groundwater Policy and Governance, in 5 GROUNDWATER GOVERNANCE: 14  
(2013), https://wrrc.arizona.edu/sites/wrrc.arizona.edu/files/pdfs/GWG_ThematicPaper5_ 
20APr2013_web.pdf (table analyzing the political economy of groundwater governance); 
John Ferejohn, California’s Groundwater: A Political Economy (working paper), https:// 
ostromworkshop.indiana.edu/pdf/seriespapers/2017spr-colloq/ferejohn-paper.pdf (2017).  
 280. See Ryan Sabalow & Phillip Reese, You Could Fill Shasta Lake 7 Times with Farm 
Groundwater Lost During State Drought, SACRAMENTO BEE (May 17, 2017, 1:51 PM), 
https://www.sacbee.com/news/state/california/water-and-drought/article151099812.html; 
see also Dean Baxtresser, Note, Antiques Roadshow: The Common Law and the Coming Age 
of Groundwater Marketing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 773, 776 (2010). 
 281. Noah Gallagher Shannon, The Water Wars of Arizona, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/19/magazine/the-water-wars-of-arizona.html. 
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finally, the California legislature managed to pass the Sustainable 
Groundwater Management Act, which delegates the effective regula-
tion of groundwater to new-formed local agencies.282 In Texas, the rule 
of capture applies to groundwater.283 Hence, it gives landowners the 
right to pump water below their property—as much of it as they 
want.284 Still, in other states, while groundwater is subject to rules like 
reasonable use (American rule) or correlative rights, it is not subject 
to a regime as thorough as surface water.285 Some states like Alabama 
do not follow the New Mexico or Hawaii286 example of integrating sur-
face and groundwater and requiring permits for the latter.287 Alabama 
applies a reasonable use for groundwater (or correlative rights)288 but 
does require a permit for surface water.289  
 Due to the aforementioned lack of regulation in both Texas and  
California, there have been discussions about the power of local  
authorities, be it counties for California or groundwater management 
districts in Texas, to prevent the exportation of groundwater  
beyond the jurisdiction where it is pumped from. In California,  
county legislation preventing exports has a long history.290 In Texas, 
groundwater management districts may set the same restrictions  
for both users within the jurisdiction and those who export to ensure 
the sustainability of the resource. These districts may impose export 
 
 282. SGMA Groundwater Management, CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., https://water.ca. 
gov/Programs/Groundwater-Management/SGMA-Groundwater-Management (last visited  
Nov. 23, 2019).  
  283. Hous. & Tex. Cent. R.R. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 280 (Tex. 1904); AMY HARD-
BERGER, TEXAS GROUNDWATER MARKETS AND THE EDWARDS AQUIFER 3 (2016), https:// 
static1.squarespace.com/static/56d1e36d59827e6585c0b336/t/5805468415d5dbb1ab59a3a9/
1476740751543/Texas-Groundwater-Markets-Hardberger.pdf. 
 284. Texas Water Law, TEX. A&M UNIV., https://texaswater.tamu.edu/water-law (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2019).  
 285. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Legal Classifications, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 
19.05 (Amy K. Keller ed., 2011) (describing groundwater legislation as “highly fragmentary” 
and “piecemeal”); see also Rebecca Nelson and Philippe  Quevauviller, Groundwater Law, in 
INTEGRATED GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT 173, 174 (Anthony J. Jakeman et al., eds., 2016). 
 286. HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-2(c) (1993). 
 287. Robert Haskell Abrams, Legal Convergence of East and West in Contemporary 
American Water Law, 42 ENVTL. L. 65, 73 (2012). 
 288. RACHAEL LOUISE CAIN ET AL., GROUNDWATER LAWS AND REGULATIONS: A PRELIMI-
NARY SURVEY OF THIRTEEN U.S. STATES 8 (Gabriel Eckstein & Amy Hardberger eds.,  
2017), https://law.tamu.edu/docs/default-source/faculty-documents/groundwater-laws-reg-
13states.pdf?sfvrsn=0. 
 289. DON R. CHRISTY ET AL., A COMPARISON OF SURFACE WATER LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
FROM SOUTHEASTERN STATES 7 (2005), https://athenaeum.libs.uga.edu/bitstream/handle/ 
10724/19397/surfacewater.pdf?sequence=1. 
 290. Gregory S. Weber, Twenty Years of Local Groundwater Export Legislation in  
California: Lessons from a Patchwork Quilt, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 657, 663 (1994); ELLEN 
HANAK & ELIZABETH STRYJEWSKI, CALIFORNIA’S WATER MARKET, BY THE NUMBERS:  
UPDATE 2012, at 16 (2012), https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_1112EHR.pdf. 
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fees, but an outright ban is not possible because they need to treat 
exporters and those using water within the jurisdiction equally.291  
 While the situation is particularly problematic in states like  
California or Texas, groundwater laws are in general out-of-date and 
not suited to respond to the challenges that water marketing poses.292 
A full-fledged regulation of water markets, including surface and 
groundwater, would be the ideal way forward. Markets in water  
rights can help water to flow to those who value it the most, encourage 
those who can sell water to be efficient in their water use, and, make 
expansions in supply through costly infrastructure less necessary.293  
 It should be noted that water is always exported because it is em-
bedded in any product produced.294 This concept is encapsulated in the 
water footprint. For example, your average eight ounce glass of milk 
requires more than sixty-seven gallons of water on average.295 If milk 
does not come from cows grazing in grasslands belonging to the same 
watershed where the milk is consumed, an export of water occurs 
every morning someone drinks milk. This Article has set aside the 
even broader concept of a water market that would account for these 
implicit water exports. However, they do play a role in shaping views 
on water allocation and markets. For example, when water runs low 
in California, critics of those producing alfalfa which ends up in China 
abound.296 
2. Water Reuse 
 Water reuse is not necessarily a win-win situation where supply 
increases and pollution in our waterways decreases. Before starting to 
reuse the water, cities treated their effluent and discharged it into the 
river.297 Many of our rivers are overallocated, and thus, downstream 
 
 291. LESIKAR ET AL., supra note 186. 
 292. See Baxtresser, supra note 280. Despite the push for groundwater markets, current 
laws are ill suited to deal with the shift toward markets deciding who is the high-value user. 
Id. “Under these laws, the legality of marketing often rests upon an antiquated, and now-
arbitrary, legal distinction of whether a given doctrine permits off-tract use.” Id. Instead of 
relying on out-of-date laws, states should actively regulate groundwater marketing. Id. 
 293. Henning Bjornlund & Jennifer McKay, Aspects of Water Markets for Developing 
Countries: Experiences from Australia, Chile and the U.S., 7 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 767, 769 
(2002). 
 294. Virtual Water Trade, WATER FOOTPRINT NETWORK, https://waterfootprint.org/en/ 
water-footprint/national-water-footprint/virtual-water-trade/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2019).  
 295. Product Gallery: Milk, WATER FOOTPRINT NETWORK, https://waterfootprint.org/en/ 
resources/interactive-tools/product-gallery/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2019). 
 296. Alastair Leithead, California Drought: Why Farmers Are ‘Exporting Water’ to 
China, BBC NEWS (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-26124989. 
 297. NAT. RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING WATER REUSE: POTENTIAL FOR EX-
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users are likely to be relying on these return-flows for decades.298  
By reusing the water, the city may be benefiting either by using it to 
satisfy its growing demand or by selling it. Right holders who divert 
water and put it to beneficial use in a prior appropriation state own 
the return flow.299 As such, they can decide to discontinue it and use it 
within the parameters of their right no matter the negative effects on 
third parties, and, perhaps, the reduction of the overall social utility. 
There is no guarantee that water re-used by the city would create more 
added value than the same water in the form of return flow being used 
by downstream users.300  
3. Going Against the Core of Prior Appropriation 
 The enhanced commodification of water that we are experiencing 
these days seems to run afoul of the very essence of water as public 
property. Many states declare in their constitutions that water  
is owned by the people of the state.301 To put that water to use, we 
allocate water rights over it. Those who obtain those water rights  
usually do it for free or by paying limited fees.302 Any commercial  
transfer of water can be described as a “windfall” profit for those  
who sell it, be it water itself or their limited right to use water.  
Thus, allowing the commodification to be described as a giveaway  
of public resources.303 Public policy reasons to allow this are that  
reallocation will put water to a more efficient use, and a higher  
price discourages wasteful use of water.304 However, while transfers of 
water are part of prior appropriation, speculation is not.305 
 
 298. DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 155 (2009); Krista Koehl, Partial 
Forfeiture of Water Rights: Oregon Compromises Traditional Principles to Achieve Flexibil-
ity, 28 ENVTL. L. 1137, 1159–60 (1998). For a general description of what happens when 
return flows are reduced, see Casado Pérez, supra note 35. 
 299. See supra note 35. 
 300. Casado Perez, supra note 35, at 11047 (explaining how modifications in the return 
flow may decrease the overall efficiency of the system using the shift from flood irrigation to 
drip irrigation which decreases the amount of return flow that reaches other users down the 
stream in the same way that water recycling does for users downstream of a city). The anal-
ysis must be done case by case.  
 301. Frank J. Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALIF. L. 
REV. 638, 639 (1957); see, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5; WYO. CONST. art. 8, § 1. 
 302. For example, in California, water rights obtained pre-1914 do not require a permit. 
Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., https://www. 
waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/board_info/faqs.html#toc178761091 (last visited Nov. 22, 
2019). Also, in California, a holder of post-1914 prior appropriation rights must pay  
both an application fee and an annual fee. The latter amounts to the greater of $100  
or $0.03 per acre-foot. Water Permit Schedule of Fees, CAL. STATE WATER RES.  
CONTROL BD., https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/fees/ 
docs/fee_schedule_summary.pdf  (last visited Nov. 20, 2019).  
 303. ITQs have also been described this way. McCay et al., supra note 234, at 96–97. 
 304. CULP ET AL., supra note 83, at 14.  
 305. Zellmer, supra note 4, at 1004.  
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 Prior appropriation has a central tenet: water has to be put to a 
beneficial use.306 This idea is embodied in two rules: the beneficial  
use requirement and the use-it-or-lose-it doctrine. If a water right 
holder does not use their water beneficially for a certain period,  
usually around five years, they may lose the water right. 307 So unlike 
with real estate or stocks and bonds, where owners can wait for the 
market to peak and then sell their assets, in water markets, owners 
cannot engage in this kind of wait-and-see.308 Prior appropriation aims 
at encouraging productive, rather than speculative investment.309That 
said, if water becomes valuable enough, as it has become nowadays, 
investors may find a way around these rules. One company, Water  
Asset Management, is taking that route—considering land an acces-
sory.310 The company focuses on water itself, but to get to it, buys land 
and tries to make use of the land even if it is not their main goal.311 
This is not such a new endeavor. The Bass Brothers, Texan oil moguls, 
bought a “$60 million investment in rights to irrigation water largely 
in the Imperial Valley in California.”312 In 1999, their company,  
Western Farms and Cattle Company, exchanged the land and water 
rights for “$250 million worth of stock in the United States Filter Cor-
poration, the world’s largest seller of water treatment equipment.”313 
United States Filter Corporation, soon to be a subsidiary of the global 
water company Vivendi and now belonging to Siemens, is pursuing the 
same endeavor as the Bass brothers did initially.314 In addition to the 
Golden State deal, the company sought a similar deal in Nevada by 
buying a ranch and water north of Reno.315  
 At least in the case of surface water, there are some restrictions  
in place that make engaging in speculation more onerous. In ground-
water, speculation is easier. Setting aside restrictions against the ex-
portation of groundwater covered in Section V.A., groundwater is ripe 
for speculation. For example, one of California’s largest farming corpo-
rations, Cadiz Inc., wanted to sell 47 trillion U.S. gallons of water from 
 
 306. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 192, at 90; THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 78, at 259–60. 
 307. Zellmer, supra note 4, at 1004. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 78, at 356.  
 308. THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 78, at 253–54. 
 309. Zellmer, supra note 4, at 1007–08.  
 310. Lustgarten & ProPublica, supra note 6. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Janet Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for  
Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 968 n.354 (1998); Passell, supra note 5. 
 313. Passell, supra note 5. Since 2004 the company is a subsidiary of Siemenes. Matthew 
Karnitschnig & Taska Manzaroli, Siemens to Buy Veolia Water Unit For $1 Billion, WALL 
STREET J. (May 13, 2004), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB108434300038209065; Neuman, 
supra note 312, at 968 n.354.  
 314. Peter Passell, A Gush of Profits From Water Sale?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 1998), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/23/business/a-gush-of-profits-from-water-sale.html. 
 315. BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 9, at 94. 
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municipalities in Southern California.316 Cadiz Inc. is thought of as  
an agricultural business, but some see it as a natural resources  
company that wants to make a profit out of blue gold.317 While water 
infrastructure may be a daunting challenge, as the somewhat failed 
deal made by T. Boone Pickens illustrates,318 it is not an impossible 
obstacle to surmount. Cadiz Inc. managed to get the approval of the 
pipeline by the Trump administration and clear the environmental  
review process imposed by the California Environmental Quality 
Act.319 However, many still think that the transfer of water outside  
the desert and depletion of the Fenner Valley Groundwater Basin 
would have effects on Joshua Tree National Park and the Mojave 
Trails National Monument that somehow had been unaccounted for in 
the pipeline’s review.320 This was expressed in a bill that the California 
legislature did not manage to pass this past summer.321 Given that 
groundwater is subject to a separate property regime than surface  
water and that California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management 
Act is not yet fully effective, the only control the state could have had 
related to the environmental effects of the infrastructure.  
V.   POTENTIAL REFORMS 
A.   Impact on Communities 
 The nested nature of the water management administration  
has opened avenues for communities impacted by water transfers to 
have their voice heard. In some cases, these communities where  
transferred water originates have veto power.322 Lower administrative 
levels, such as counties in the United States,323 have exercised  
their power to prohibit the transfer of water that originates from  
fallowing, even at the cost of preventing transactions otherwise bene-
ficial.324 This may reflect a parochial view of public interest. Such 
 
 316. Id. 
 317. Julia Sizek, The Trouble with Cadiz, MOJAVE PROJECT, http://mojaveproject.org/ 
dispatches-item/the-trouble-with-cadiz/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2018). 
 318. See supra pp. 15 and notes 99–103. 
 319. Milestones, CADIZ,  https://www.cadizinc.com/milestones/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2020). 
 320. Don’t Drain Our Desert Water, NAT. PARKS CONSERVATION ASSOC., https://www. 
npca.org/advocacy/70-don-t-drain-our-desert-water (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). 
 321. James & Wyloge, supra note 143 (citing S.B. 120, 2017-2018 Leg. (Cal. 2017)). 
 322. Casado Perez, supra note 218.  
 323. HANAK, supra note 94 at 25–68, app. C. In chapters 3 through 5, Hanak sets out the 
current practices of counties. These are the basis for the empirical study of Appendix C 
where the variables that explain why a county adopts export restrictions are tested. Id.; 
Thompson, supra note 38, at 724–26 (describing the institutional obstacles to interregional 
trade posed by Californian mutual and water districts). 
 324. HANAK, supra note 93, at 73. Imperial Irrigation District had, as some other local 
agencies, a policy disallowing fallowing as a source for water transfers. 
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extreme measures should not be allowed if a market is to function 
properly, but the community concerns cannot be simply ignored.  
 Restricting, albeit not prohibiting, transactions outside a jurisdic-
tion is another mechanism to address community concerns regarding 
origin, in water325 and in other resources.326 It can be interpreted  
as protection of community life, but a justification based on the envi-
ronmental impact in the basin could also be offered. Victoria in  
Australia imposed a 4% cap on trade beyond the irrigation district, 
that is, on the volume of water entitlements that can be traded  
permanently out of an irrigation district.327 Therefore, fewer workers 
will lose their jobs or need to find a job in another sector. These  
caps are similar solutions to the limits on the amount transferrable 
imposed for environmental reasons,328 in part because neither the  
environment nor communities have clear right-holders who can  
defend their interests given the organizational problems of atomized 
groups. An alternative way to achieve a similar result is by reducing 
transferability and allowing only certain right-holders to trade with 
certain other defined right-holders. This is how some ITQ frameworks 
have achieved it.329 
 Beyond caps, there have been instances of monetary compensation 
by taxing transactions. In Butte County, California, around 2001,  
a fee (5%, which amounted to $3.75 per acre-foot) was established  
to compensate for the community loses.330 In other cases, a lump- 
sum was assigned to tackle the revitalization of the community.  
One of the largest and more important transactions, the one agreed  
 
  
 
 325. See generally BARLOW & CLARKE, supra note 9, at 89. 
 326. BUCK, supra note 234, at 6. 
 327. There is a cap exchange rate that is not fulfilled by the individuals but by the state 
with its own entitlements to further mitigate potential effects. Hence, even if the buyer in 
Victoria will receive 0.9 m3, 0.09 more will be left in the river (10% of 0.9 is 0.09) by the 
State from its own endowment. Hence, the water that is actually left in the river is 0.19, 
more quantity than before in aggregate, even though the flow between upstream and down-
stream will be reduced. Waye & Son, supra note 49, at 444. For an account on the inefficiency 
arising from the cap, see id. at 444–45. 
 328. Murphy et al., supra note 236, at 92. 
 329. BUCK, supra note 234, at 4. 
 330. HANAK, supra note 93, at 73.  
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to in 2002 between the Imperial Irrigation District and San Diego,  
contained a clause establishing $20 million to mitigate third party  
economic effects.331  
 There are mechanisms which are not exactly caps, but which  
impose practical barriers to transferring water over a certain amount 
out of the jurisdiction. For example, Section 1745.05 of the California 
Water Code established a threshold of 20% of the total water supply 
coming from fallowed fields in a given year to trigger a public hear-
ing.332 The same idea underlies the legislative approval requirement in 
Oregon for water transfers out of the state,333 which obviously implies 
very high transaction costs and which seems politically guided more 
than technically guided. The California Water Code’s provision or the 
Oregon requirement are examples of ensuring a right to participation 
in water governance.334  
 Adapting these cap or fee mechanisms to the challenges that new 
investments in water pose is not an easy task because transactions are 
taking very different forms, and the decision-making power over the 
water is now further and further away from the community.  
B.   Vouchers, Tiered Pricing:  
How to Provide Water for Our Basic Needs 
 The amount of water that we need for our most essential needs is a 
small percentage of the overall water market.335 International organi-
zations, countries, and even a state in the United States, have framed 
the essential need of water as a human right.336 The proposals on how 
 
 331. Richard Howitt & Ellen Hanak, Incremental Water Market Development: The  
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 332. CAL. WATER CODE § 1745.05 (2020). 
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 334. For an account of a right to participate in water governance, see Larson, supra note 
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has much in common with negative rights. See id. However, some of the tenets he argues 
the right of participation, as he conceives it, have plenty in common with the rights of com-
munities in this paper. See id. He describes these participation mechanisms as follows: “Em-
powering disadvantaged communities and establishing procedural safeguards will facilitate 
fair and broad stakeholder participation in water--policy development and mitigate the ef-
fect of government corruption on sustainable and equitable water policy.” Id. at 2203. 
 335. Glennon, supra note 38, at 1896. For other assertions that the amount needed to 
cover basic needs is a tiny fraction of the total, see Vanessa Casado-Pérez, Go with the Flow: 
Lessons from Water Management and Water Markets, in GOVERNING ESSENTIAL RESOURCES 
IN ACTION 237, 241 (2016); see also Thompson, supra note 45, at 38. 
336 Id. at 2204. While the human right to water is not explicitly recognized in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights or the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cul-
tural Rights, it is implicitly recognized in article 25 of the Universal Declaration (the right 
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to materialize that human right take different forms, but, more often 
than not, they configure it as a positive right. Positive rights require 
governmental action. In the case of a human right to water, each  
person has a right to receive a certain amount of water, and the gov-
ernment has a duty to provide it.337 Another way to conceptualize this 
type of human right to water is as a right of provision.338  
 Within this paradigm of the right to water as a right to receive a 
certain amount of water, it is conceivable to allocate that percentage 
of our water that would cover basic needs based on principles other 
than market ones. The market could allocate the rest of the water 
based on economic efficiency principles.339 In Australia’s Murray  
Darling Basin, the authorities excluded 65% of the water from the 
market, not based on human rights but based on environmental  
concerns.340 Even with this exclusion, Australian water markets are 
praised as the example to follow in the dry American West.341 
 The special nature of water is reflected in the tiered pricing that 
many jurisdictions have adopted to price household water,342 and that 
if implemented, could mitigate this access concern. For almost any 
good, the more you buy, the cheaper it is per unit. In water, where 
tiered pricing is adopted, the first liters of water are relatively cheap, 
but if you want more of it, it steeply becomes more expensive.343 This 
 
to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family) 
and articles 11 and 12 of the Covenant (the rights to an adequate standard of living and 
health). Id. at 2206-07 (citing GA Res 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(Dec. 10, 1948); GA Res 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cul-
tural Rights (Jan. 3, 1976)). In addition, the United Nations General Assembly passed a 
resolution in 2010 recognizing the right to water. 124 countries voted in favor but 41 nations 
abstained. According to Larson, the abstentions are due to the uncertainty on how to imple-
ment the human right to water given its configuration as a positive or provision right. Lar-
son, supra note 117, at 2184 (citing G.A. Res. 64/292 ¶¶ 5, 8 (July 28, 2010); see supra notes 
195–198; Bluemel, supra note 245, at 997. 
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 338. Id. at 2204. 
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ones is explained in Victor B. Flatt, Let Us Drink Our Fill: The History of Water and Its 
Impact on Resource and Environmental Management, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. (2006). 
 340. Courtenay, supra note 214. 
 341. See Robert David Pilz, Lessons in Water Policy Innovation from the World’s Driest 
Inhabited Continent: Using Water Allocation Plans and Water Markets to Manage Water 
Scarcity, 14 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 97, 115-16 (2010); Laura Taylor, Drought Down Under 
and Lessons in Water Policy for the Golden State, 40 ENVIRONS 53, 71 (2016); WILL FARGHER, 
RESPONDING TO SCARCITY: LESSONS FROM AUSTRALIAN WATER MARKETS IN SUPPORTING AG-
RICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY DURING DROUGHT, https://www.oecd.org/tad/sustainable-agri-
culture/49192129.pdf. 
 342. ELLEN HANAK ET AL., PAYING FOR WATER IN CALIFORNIA 29 (2014), https:// 
www.ppic.org/publication/paying-for-water-in-california/. 
 343. Interview by Janny Choy with Frank Wolak, Economics Professor, Stanford  
University (Apr. 24, 2015), https://waterinthewest.stanford.edu/news-events/news-press- 
releases/pricing-water-conservation-using-tiered-water-rates-structures-qa. 
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protects those consuming just to cover their most basic needs, while, 
at the same time, discouraging large water users who put a strain  
on scarce water resources.344 Tiered pricing still has some problems  
because, in many jurisdictions, it can only be implemented if it  
reflects the cost of service and discouraging over-consumption may  
not be allowed.345 Still, for the purposes of ensuring that those with 
less income pay less, this is no obstacle.  
 Tiered pricing, to the extent that it is not means-tested as it has not 
been in its current implementation, will cross-subsidize the necessary 
water for all, rich and poor. If a more targeted scheme is preferred, 
vouchers may be the best avenue. The Portland Water Bureau offers 
households enrolled in its Low-Income Utility Assistance Program one 
$150 crisis voucher every 12 months to cover their water bills. The 
customer must pay a portion of the bill to receive assistance.346 Chile 
also has a full-fledged, means-tested subsidy program.347 This subsidy 
was established in 1989 by Act to pay for potable water consumption 
and sewerage service of the waste waters.348 Individual households 
need to apply for it through the municipality, but it is funded by the 
central government.349 The subsidy takes into account the income of 
the families and the level of the tariffs, so it varies by region.350 The 
subsidy only covers the first fifteen cubic meters per month, above 
 
 344. Adam Soliman & Henry McCann, The “Inexact Science” of Water Pricing, PUBL. 
POL’Y INST. CAL. (July 15, 2015), https://www.ppic.org/blog/the-inexact-science-of-water-
pricing/. 
 345. This is the case of California where Proposition 218 (1996) established that munic-
ipalities cannot charge more than the cost for providing a service. Accordingly, tiered pricing 
of heavy users cannot be justified to enhance conservation. The cost of service limitation may 
impose some barriers to the use of tiered pricing based on income or pricing water used for 
basic needs cheaper. For an account on California, see Dale Kasler, California Supreme 
Court Won’t Budge on Water Rates, SACRAMENTO BEE (July 23, 2015, 10:42 AM), 
https://www.sacbee.com/news/california/water-and-drought/article28414762.html#story-
link=cpy.  
 346. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRINKING WATER AND WASTEWATER UTILITY CUS-
TOMER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 12 (2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-
04/documents/dw-ww_utilities_cap_combined_508.pdf. This is not the only program that the 
Portland Water Bureau has; it “also offers a Safety Net Program that provides assistance to 
residential ratepayers facing a qualifying emergency (such as change in employment, unre-
imbursed medical bills, or divorce). The Safety Net Program can delay service disconnection, 
waive delinquency charges, offer interest-free payment plans, and include financial 
assistance. The duration of temporary assistance is established on a case-by-case basis.” Id. 
 347. For an academic commentary, see ANDRÉS GÓMEZ-LOBO, INCENTIVE-BASED SUBSI-
DIES: DESIGNING OUTPUT-BASED SUBSIDIES FOR WATER CONSUMPTION (2001), https:// 
openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/11380/multi0page.pdf?sequence= 
1&isAllowed=y. See also Andrés Gómez-Lobo & Dante Contreras, Water Subsidy Policies: A 
Comparison of the Chilean and Colombian Schemes, 17 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 391 (2003). 
 348. Law No. 18778 art. 1, Enero 17, 1989, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). 
 349. Gómez-Lobo & Contreras, supra note 347, at 394. 
 350. Id. 
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that, the household must pay the full price.351 For those fifteen cubic 
meters the subsidy covers between 25% to 85% of the fix and variable 
costs.352 For families in extreme poverty, the level of the subsidy is 
100% for the first fifteen cubic meters.353  
 The different options to close the affordability gap can also be seen 
as a way to fulfill the human right to water or the right to water guar-
anteed in many constitutions as a provision right, the right to receive 
a certain amount of clean water.354 
C.   Closing the Regulatory Gaps 
1. Joint Management of Surface and Groundwater 
 First, even before tackling the connection between surface and 
groundwater, groundwater needs to be regulated to avoid overexploi-
tation. Otherwise, an aquifer is the paramount example of a site for a 
tragedy of the commons.355 
 But beyond the regulation of groundwater itself, when groundwater 
and surface water are connected, the need to manage groundwater and 
surface water jointly has long been ascertained. In 1973, the National 
Water Commission, in its final report, “Water Policies for the Future,” 
included the need for integrated management of surface and ground-
water.356  The literature is abundant on this issue.357 Under conjunctive 
management, “surface water and aboveground storage facilities  
are operated together with groundwater supplies and underground 
storage as components of a single system (i.e., operated ‘conjunc-
tively’). Multiple water needs are met by shifting mixes of surface and 
groundwater supplies determined by their relative availability.”358 
Conjunctive management can occur in some instances even when  
there is not an institutional framework that oversees surface and 
 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. at 394 n.7 
 353. Law No. 19949 art. 8, Mayo 17, 2004,  DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). 
 354. Larson, supra note 117, at 2187. 
 355. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968). 
 356. NAT’L WATER COMM’N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 232 (1973). 
 357. See, e.g., William Blomquist et al., Institutions and Conjunctive Water Management 
Among Three Western States, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 653, 653 (2001); Frank J. Trelease, Con-
junctive Use of Groundwater and Surface Water, 27 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 12 (1982); 
Joseph L. Sax, We Don’t Do Groundwater: A Morsel of California Legal History, 6 U. DENV. 
WATER L. REV. 269, 270 (2003) (discussing and critiquing California law); Hanak et al.,  
supra note 53–57 (2010) (one of the analyzed “legal myths” in California is the idea that 
groundwater and surface water are two distinct resources).  
 358. Blomquist et al., supra note 357, at 655. 
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groundwater jointly.359 But without such a system, which usually takes 
the form of a permit system, conjunctive management is much more 
expensive and difficult to implement.360 Colorado is a good example  
to follow. Since the 1950s and 1960s the connection between surface 
water and groundwater has been blatantly clear in the South Platte 
basin.361 If individuals start pumping groundwater, senior surface  
water users cannot receive water. In order to protect senior water  
right holders, conjunctive management was a must.362 The Colorado 
legislature brought all surface and groundwater within a watershed 
under the prior appropriation system.363 This means that older senior 
water users, which will inevitably be surface water users, will always 
have priority.364 This may perpetuate older, less productive uses of  
water if there is no mechanism to push them toward efficiency. Either 
regulation or market incentives are ways to attenuate this path- 
dependence problem. Conjunctive management with a single permit 
system over surface and groundwater should close the gaps exploited 
by current water users and new investors.  
2. Return Flow and Recycled Water 
 Any right holder can use the return flow within the parameters of 
its right.365 In other words, a right holder who was producing return 
flow and returning it to the river can decide to consume the return  
flow in its same land for the same use. However, if the right holder 
wants to use it in other areas—like a city wanting to use it in a newly 
incorporated area—or sell it to third parties, the change in the water 
right should go through the approval process that any change or water 
transaction goes through. Accordingly, if a user wants to stop return-
ing its treated wastewater to a river, he is free to do so. In doing so, he 
may be harming other users who have been relying on its return flow. 
 
 359. Id. at 659, 666 (Describing how conjunctive management projects in California of-
ten involve multiple organizations. While the number of organizations involved is correlated 
with higher transaction costs, conjunctive management projects have taken off even on those 
scenarios). 
 360. Id. at 683. Nebraska has also implemented integrated management plans in the 
Platte basin.  To understand the challenges it has faced, see generally Christina Hoffman & 
Sandra Zellmer, Assessing Institutional Ability to Support Adaptive, Integrated Water Re-
sources Management, 91 NEB. L. REV. 805 (2013). For a historical assessment of the evolution 
towards adaptative, integrated management in the Platte basin, see Annah E. Birge et al., 
Social-Ecological Resilience and Law in the Platte River Basin, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 229 (2014). 
 361. Blomquist et al., supra note 357, at 674. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id.  
 365. See supra notes 35 and 297-99; see also THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 78, at 174. 
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Many of our streams are overallocated.366 Therefore, junior users have 
been allocated water which would not exist but for return flow367 and 
changes in the water rights producing the return flow have effects on 
many users. If the user decides to reuse its return flows within the 
parameters of its original right, other right holders will not be able to 
object.368 Both those junior right holders and the environment will be 
harmed because less water will be available.369 There is no guarantee 
that the return flow reused by a city brings about more social benefit 
than the previous de facto allocation of that return flow to users junior 
to the city. In contrast, if the user decided to use its recycled water 
beyond the place of use defined in its water right or sell it to third 
parties, he would probably need to undergo an approval process 
though and the effects on other water users and the environment 
would be accounted for.370 
 Nonetheless, selling recycled water does not trigger the approval 
process everywhere. In Arizona, recycled water was considered a new 
product right-holders could sell in Arizona Public Service Co. v. 
Long.371 The majority in Arizona Public Service Co. v. Long held, “the 
effluent in question is neither groundwater nor surface water. 
Whether diverted by appropriation or withdrawn from the ground,  
after use by the municipalities the water loses its original character as 
groundwater or surface water and becomes, instead, just what the 
statute describes—effluent.”372. Or, as the dissent puts very eloquently:  
Without question, Arizona’s surface water code governs those  
appropriations, and subjects them to the prior appropriation and 
beneficial use doctrines. Since the water when taken is subject  
 
 366. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY AND DE-
MAND STUDY 3 (2012); Theodore E. Grantham & Joshua H. Viers, 100 Years of California’s 
Water Rights System: Patterns, Trends, and Uncertainty, ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 3 (2014); 
Dave Owen, Overallocation, Conflict, and Water Transfers ,  ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 9 (2014). 
 367. See supra notes 42 and 297–99; see also Reed D Benson, Public on Paper: the Failure 
of Law to Protect Public Water Uses in the Western United States, INT’L. J. OF RURAL L. AND 
POL’Y. 1 (2011) (arguing that many streams in the West are fully allocated and given the 
protection of senior appropriators, water is more private than public in those streams).  
 368. See supra note 42 and 297-99 and corresponding text 
  369. See generally, supra note 36. For a study of the negative effects of increases in irri-
gation efficiency translating into an increase of water consumption and reduction of return 
flows in the Elephant Butte District in New Mexico, see Frank A. Ward & Manuel Pulido-
Velazquez, Water Conservation in Irrigation Can Increase Water Use, 105 PNAS 18215 
(2008). 
 370. A change in the place of use or the type of use of a water right—such as the ones a 
transfer of recycled water to third parties or the use of recycled water beyond the original 
place of use imply—triggers a review procedure. The parties will have to seek approval be-
fore a water agency, and the changes will only go forward if they do not injure third parties 
and, in some cases, the public interest. For an overview of the change in prior appropriation 
water rights, see ADLER ET AL. , supra note 22, at 153–61. 
 371. See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Long, 773 P.2d 988 (1989). 
 372. Id. at 997. 
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to beneficial use limitations, the real issue becomes whether,  
consistent with beneficial use limitations, the water components of 
the sewage effluent can be sold by the Cities. The majority fails  
to resolve this basic issue, but rather focuses on the end product, 
sewage effluent, and treats it without regard to the principles  
governing the use and disposition of the effluent’s groundwater and 
surface water components. From this premise the majority then  
concludes that effluent is not subject to regulation under Arizona’s 
groundwater and surface water codes.373 
While it is a problem that prior appropriation allows a city to reuse 
the water in the same area of its original water rights even though the 
return flow may be more productive elsewhere, it is important that at 
least effluent is not treated as a different product so that at least the 
sale of effluent cannot escape the scrutiny. 
 However, a system that makes benefiting from recycling water too 
difficult may discourage investing in these technologies even though 
they may still provide a feasible source of water.374 To make both  
protection of the current de facto allocation and incentives for recycling 
compatible, the Oregon water conservation statute may offer a model 
to follow. Conservation, thanks to efficient irrigation techniques, runs 
into similar problems as the recycling of the return flow. While drip 
irrigation is more efficient in an agricultural field than flood irrigation, 
the systemic effects are unclear.375 Drip irrigation may allow for more 
dense production in a field, consuming more water than the lower  
production on the same field under flood irrigation did.376 Under  
flood irrigation the unconsumed water went downstream to other  
users.377 Oregon, acknowledging that, first tried to define conserved 
water based on the amount of water consumed.378 Second, and more 
important for the purposes of properly regulating reused water, it  
allowed the farmer to keep 75% of the water conserved, while the  
other 25% is allocated to the state and permitted to continue its course 
downstream.379 Twenty-five percent might be reduced if the farmer  
has received public funds to pay for the change in irrigation systems.380 
  
 
 373. Id. at 999–1000. 
 374. For a general view on how water regulation have hindered investment in technology 
innovations in water compare to similar industries, see AJAMI ET AL., supra note 161, 
 375. See generally Casado Pérez, supra note 35. 
 376. Id. at 11046–47. 
 377. Id. at 11049–50. 
 378. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.455 (1987). Casado Pérez, supra note 35, at 11055. 
 379. Casado Pérez, supra note 35, at 11055–56. 
 380. Id. at 11056. 
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3. Further Regulations to Prevent Speculation 
(a)  Limits on How Many Rights One User Can Hold 
 This concern about concentration of rights in a few hands381 is not 
exclusive of water and has translated into limits of how many rights 
someone can hold. This regulation capping the amount of rights any 
given right-holder can have has taken on a role traditionally set for 
antitrust law.382 For example, in the surf clam and ocean quahog in 
the Eastern United States fishery, there were no caps on the amount 
of quotas an individual could get because it was believed that antitrust 
could deal with market concentration.383  
 There are limits in some fisheries on the number of quotas that 
someone can accumulate.384 Similarly, during the homesteading pe-
riod, there were set limits on the amount of land someone could 
claim.385 There are also limits on the volume of oil leases that someone 
can hold on federal lands.386 There could be both fairness and efficiency 
concerns at play. By distributing the wealth among more people, more 
people could have their livelihood ensured. It may also be efficient to 
ensure some base level for everyone if there were not economies of 
scale lost. 
 In fisheries, ITQs were first established not only to address the 
overexploitation of the fishery, but also a problem of overcapitaliza-
tion.387 The overexploitation of fisheries is unquestioned.388 Limits on 
the overall capture of fish preceded the introduction of an ITQ system. 
This was the case in, for example, the Nova Scotia’s small dragger or 
the surf clam and ocean quahog in Eastern United States fisheries.389 
They were not distributed between individuals though, so as a result, 
fishermen invested in large boats to be able to capture as many fish as 
 
 381. See supra section IV.D. 
 382.  See supra notes 258, 260, and 261. 
 383. MID-ATLANTIC FISHERIES MGMT. COUNCIL & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV.,  
ATLANTIC SURF CLAM AND OCEAN QUAHOG EXCESSIVE SHARES AMENDMENT (2019), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/511cdc7fe4b00307a2628ac6/t/5d2e132497c4d500016
510e8/1563300650253/Excessive+Shares+EA+SCOQ+07-16-2019-Complete.pdf; B.J. 
McCay, Initial Allocation of Individual Transferable Quotas in the US Surf Clam and Ocean 
Quahog, in 44 CASE STUDIES ON THE ALLOCATION OF TRANSFERABLE QUOTA RIGHTS IN  
FISHERIES 86–90 (R. Shotton ed., 2001), http://www.fao.org/3/y2684e/y2684e09.htm#P0_0. 
 384. See infra notes 397–98.  
 385. See infra notes 406–12. 
 386. See infra notes 413–21.  
 387. McCay et al., supra note 234, at 89. 
 388. Mukhisa Kituyi, 90% of Fish Stocks Are Used Up—Fisheries Subsidies Must Stop, 
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. (July 13, 2018), https://unctad.org/ 
en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=1812. 
 389. McCay et al., supra note 234, at 88–89. 
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possible as fast as possible since they were competing.390 When estab-
lishing ITQs, as the next step after setting the cap, there were two 
particularly controversial issues: the basis to establish the quota  
and the potential for consolidation.391 For example, past catch volume 
could be the criterium chosen to allocate the fishing quotas. In the 
Nova Scotia fishery, which allocates rights to fish cod, among other 
species, the historical catch criterium was mitigated by including  
variables regarding the investment in vessels and by weighing more 
heavily recent years data.392 The latter was meant to prevent newcom-
ers from being at a disadvantage.393 Including these criteria shows that 
efficiency was not the only goal in mind. 394 Under a pure efficiency 
framework, the distribution of quotas should not matter given their 
transferability. In fishing quotas, like in many other resources, distrib-
utive concerns are at play.395 
 The rate of consolidation was a concern in the Magnuson Act in the 
United States. Among its standards, it sets that “no particular indi-
vidual, corporation, or other entity acquire[d] an excessive share of 
such privileges.”396 Furthermore, in 2006, the Magnuson-Stevenson 
Act was revised to hold that all ITQ programs must:  
[E]nsure that limited access privilege holders do not acquire an ex-
cessive share of the total limited access privileges in the program 
by—(i) establishing a maximum share, expressed as a percentage of 
the total limited access privileges, that a limited access privilege 
holder is permitted to hold, acquire, or use; and (ii) establishing any 
other limitations or measures necessary to prevent an inequitable 
concentration of limited access privileges.397 
Consolidation is targeted by setting a 2% limit in the Nova Scotia 
dragger fishery: “no person or enterprise could hold more than 2% of 
the ITQ for a species in a specific management area.”398 Concentration 
may sometimes be inevitable because “[i]ndependent ownership is  
 
 390. Id. at 89. 
 391. Id. at 90–91. 
 392. Id. at 96 
 393. Id. 
 394. Id. at 95–96 (explaining how the equity concerns where addressed in the Nova  
Scotia groundfish fishery). 
 395. Id. 
 396. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 
1851(a)(4) (2012). 
 397. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 
2006, 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(5)(D) (2012)) 
 398. Bonnie J. McCay & Carolyn F. Creed, Individual Transferable Quotas in Clams 
and Fish: A Comparative Analysis, 82ND STATUTORY MEETING, INT’L COUNCIL FOR THE EXPL. 
OF THE SEAS 2–3 (1994), https://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/5673/Indi-
vidual%20transferable%20quotas%20in%20clams%20and%20fish%20a%20compara-
tive%20analysis.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; McCay et al., supra note 234, at 97. 
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often a fiction.”399 There are informal ways of vertical and horizontal 
consolidation. For example, in Canada, there may be agreements be-
tween processors and boat operators.400 Despite the limits, the dragger 
fishery in Nova Scotia has experienced consolidation, dominance of a 
few firms, harder working conditions for the crew, in part due to the 
reduction in the number of vessels, and a geographic imbalance; that 
is, landings have concentrated in certain ports and away from oth-
ers.401 While the latter may be explained by the fish stocks,402 the con-
centration in the industry is the result of the quotas, as the example 
of fisheries without limits on the number of quotas someone can hold 
shows.403 Alaska’s sablefish and halibut fisheries have tackled this 
problem of consolidation into large companies by creating different 
types of quotas for different types of vessels, and those shares can only 
be transferred within the class.404 Small boat shares cannot be trans-
ferred to large ones.405  
 Homesteading is also a good example of limiting the size of individ-
ual allocations. Allocation of land, a natural resource, to those who 
moved West was limited to a certain number of acres.406 The motiva-
tion, once again, seemed to combine efficiency and distributive con-
cerns. The acreage per farm was limited, but it varied depending on 
the conditions of the lands being allocated.407 The Homestead Act of 
1862 offered 160 acres per farm,408 but that proved to be too little for 
Nebraska. As a result, the Kinkaid Act of 1904 granted up to 640 
acres.409 Similarly, while the Timber Culture Act of 1873 offered 160 
acres per farm,410 grazing required more. The Stock-Raising Home-
stead Act of 1916 provided for grants of 640-acre tracts of grazing 
land.411 Often these grants required some productive use of the land.412  
 
 399. McCay et al., supra note 234, at 94. 
 400. Id. 
 401. Id. at 103–04. 
 402. Id. at 104. 
 403. Id. (comparing the Nova Scotia fishery with New Jersey ones). 
 404. BUCK, supra note 234, at 7. 
 405. Id.  
 406. See JAN LAITOS, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 267–69 (3d ed. 2018). 
 407. BUCK, supra note 234, at 7. 
 408. Homestead Act of 1862, Pub. L. No. 37–75, 12 Stat. 392 (repealed 1976). 
 409. Kinkaid Act of 1904, Pub. L. No. 58-233, 33 Stat. 547 (repealed 1976). MONTY 
MCCORD, CALLING THE BRANDS: STOCK DETECTIVES IN THE WILD WEST 30 (2018). 
 410. Timber Culture Act of 1873, Pub. L. No. 42–277, 17 Stat. 605 (repealed 1891). 
 411. Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64–290, 39 Stat. 862 (repealed 
in part 1976). For a discussion, see LAITOS supra note 403, at 319. 
 412. Summary of the Homestead Act, NAT’L PARK SERV. https://www.nps.gov/ 
common/uploads/teachers/lessonplans/HomesteadActSummary.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 
2019); Anna Khomina, The Homestead Act of 1862: Dreams and Realities, U.S. HISTORY 
SCENE, http://ushistoryscene.com/article/1862-homestead-act/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2019). 
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 The same is true for oil and gas leases on federal lands. The enact-
ment of the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act shows Congress’s intent to  
prevent concentration in the oil and gas sector by limiting the amount 
of rights to exploit energy minerals on federal lands individuals could 
hold.413 Initially the limit was three oil or gas leases in any one state 
and not more than one lease within the geological structure.414 How-
ever, the Act did not contain a limitation on the number of acres. 
Hence, someone who had three 160 acre-permits was maxed out, as 
was the person holding three 1,000 acre-permits.415 This was corrected 
in 1926.416 The first amendment to the Mineral Leasing Act included a 
shift on the limitation from the number of permits to the number of 
acres. It limited each individual right-holder to 7,560 acres in each 
state and 2,560 acres on a structure.417 In practice, right-holders  
managed to work around these restrictions. Operators managed to 
control large expanses of land by taking operating agreements from 
the permittees, rather than assignments of the rights.418 This practice 
was accepted by the Department of Interior until 1938, when it estab-
lished that those operating agreements counted toward the maximum 
acreage of the operator.419 In 1946, however, the Mineral Leasing Act 
was amended again. It expanded the acreage limitation per state to 
15,360 acres and abolished the limitations within a single formation.420 
Today the Act reads as follows: 
(1) No person, association, or corporation . . . shall take, hold, 
own or control at one time . . . oil or gas leases . . . on land held under 
the provisions of this chapter exceeding in the aggregate two hun-
dred forty-six thousand and eighty acres in any one State other than 
Alaska . . . . In the case of the State of Alaska, the limit shall be 
three hundred thousand acres in the northern leasing district and 
three hundred thousand acres in the southern leasing district. 
(2) No person, association, or corporation shall take, hold, own, 
or control at one time options to acquire interests in oil or gas leases 
under the provisions of this chapter which involve, in the aggregate, 
more than two hundred thousand acres of land in any one State 
other than Alaska, or, in the case of Alaska, more than two hundred 
thousand acres in each of its two leasing districts, as hereinbefore 
described. No option to acquire any interest in such an oil or gas 
 
 413. Ross L. Malone, Jr., Oil and Gas Leases on Federal Lands, 14 MONT. L. REV. 20, 28 
(1953). 
 414. Id. at 25 
 415. Id. 
 416. Id. at 26. 
 417. Id.  
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. at 28. 
 420. Id. at 32. 
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lease shall be enforcible if entered into for a period of more than 
three years . . . without the prior approval of the Sec-retary [sic].421 
 Translating these examples to water is not straight forward. One 
potential way to do so is to limit trades to only right-holders. This  
has the clear problem of discriminating potential new entrants on  
any market who needed water for their production. Those entrants 
would have to apply before an agency for a water right. The process is 
cumbersome, but so is the process of getting a transaction approved. 
However, a new application may be more difficult to obtain because 
streams are already overallocated. If a stream is already fully allo-
cated and there is not surplus water to allocate, any new use, particu-
larly a diversion, will have negative effects for other users or the  
environment. Those effects can easily be harsher than the effects of  
a transaction where the place of use or the type of use may change 
affecting other users and the environment, but the quantity consumed 
remains the same. While imperfect, a middle ground solution could be 
a thorough review of any water transaction by the agency that requires 
the company or individual acquiring the water right to actually use 
the water, perhaps even for a number of years, before being able to sell 
it. While this will not eliminate every single strategic behavior, it may 
discourage some. It may still be worth it to have to use the water right 
during a period before trading and speculating with it, but it will  
certainly be more expensive.  
(b) Establishing Restrictions on Who Can Hold a Water Right  
 Most natural resources are conceived as public. As such, any indi-
vidual right over them may be subject to limitations. Among those, 
there are limitations on who can own those limited rights. Beyond re-
strictions on foreign ownership,422 it is often the case that regulations 
reflect the collective will of ensuring that those rights are productive 
and that windfall profits do not befall those who got a right to use a 
public resource.  
 In water, given that these new investors in water rights have man-
aged to go around the forfeiture and the non-use prohibition, restrict-
ing who can hold a water right could be an avenue to mitigate the spec-
ulation problem. The example of grazing permits may provide a model. 
The Taylor Grazing Act defines who can hold a grazing permit and the 
Clinton Rangeland Reform implemented further such definition.423 
The move in the case of water rights would be the reverse than the one 
taken by Secretary Babbitt, who aimed at allowing environmental 
 
 421. 30 U.S.C. § 184(d) (2005) (emphasis added). 
 422. See supra text accompanying notes 161-72. 
 423. LAITOS, supra note 406, at 267-69. 
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groups to hold grazing rights so that they would let them rest and 
ranchlands would recover. The courts struck down the regulations, re-
ferring back to the original Taylor Grazing Act text that requires the 
right holder to be engaged in the livestock business.424 Similarly, in 
some Canadian fisheries, there are requirements to be a licensed fish-
erman and a citizen.425 The latter requirement is also found in the Min-
eral Leasing Act of 1920 still today.426 This type of restriction could 
work well for certain types of water users, mainly, farmers, but it will 
be hard to implement as there is no licensing in place. However, the 
beneficial use requirement plays a similar role to the one played by 
“engaged in the livestock business.” Like in the grazing rights or the 
fishing quotas, the legislation may be sidestepped by clever minds who 
irrigate the land and produce some low maintenance crops as an ex-
cuse or who graze two llamas instead of six cows because they consume 
less water. While coming up with a restrictive definition of beneficial 
use may be problematic, regulations could require a certain number of 
years of a particular type of use before the permit could be transferred 
to other uses. This will lock water in the agricultural sector but it will 
at least ensure a lower price given the lower demand for these type of 
rights for a while, further discouraging speculators.  
 Still, within this idea of limiting who can hold a right, it is worth 
exploring one of the limitations in the Alaska halibut and sablefish 
fisheries. In those fisheries, there are prohibitions to discourage  
absentee-owners such as requiring the quota-holders to be on-board.427 
Discouraging absentee-owners allows for the control of the rights to 
remain somewhat local.  
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 There are plenty of forces pushing water to be the new oil as it  
becomes scarcer due to climate change and increases in demand due 
to population growth. Even setting aside the physical differences such 
as the renewable nature of water, oil and water do not mix. The main 
difference is that while oil is essential, it is rarely irreplaceable. In 
contrast, water is imprinted by a sense that without it there is no  
life, and this belief informs the reluctance of many to let markets reign 
in water. But current investment in water as a commodity challenges  
 
 
 424. 43 U.S.C. § 315b (2012). 
 425. McCay et al., supra note 234, at 97. 
 426. Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-146, 41 Stat. 437 (codified as 
amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 48, 181–287 (1982)). 
 427. Pacific Halibut Fisheries; Groundfish of the Gulf of Alaska; Groundfish of the Ber-
ing Sea and Aleutian Islands; Limited Access Management of Fisheries off Alaska, 58 Fed. 
Reg. 59,375 (Nov. 9, 1993) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 204, 672, 675, 676). 
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more than just our feelings about water. New investments escape  
the current regulatory framework for water rights aimed at ensuring 
efficiency and fairness in water management.  
 This Article does not claim that we should do away with water mar-
kets. In fact, given the myriad of forms that those markets in water 
take, it is unclear whether we could stop them. Markets can be positive 
tools for water management if they prompt us to be more conscientious 
in our water use. While in that sense, water is the new oil, a water 
market must be a regulated one. Investment should not reign un-
checked. Water systems and uses are interdependent. As a result, ex-
ternalities may abound. States should ensure that the investment does 
not come at the cost of non-internalized negative externalities to other 
water users or the environment. Furthermore, given that in water, 
fairness seems to be more important for the public,428 this Article has 
also offered tools for those states that want to go further and correct 
the potential unfairness of water markets. The tools offered here have 
focused on water, but they could be extended to many other natural 
resources that climate change will make ripe for markets.  
 
  
 
 428. Dellapenna, supra note 37, at 364; Victor Brajer & Wade E. Martin, Allocating a 
‘Scarce’ Resource, Water in the West: More Market-Like Incentives Can Extend Supply, but 
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